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MADE IN THE U.S.A.: CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY AND COLLECTIVE 
IDENTITY IN THE AMERICAN 
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
Benjamin Levin* 
Abstract: This Article challenges the corporate-constructed image of 
American business and industry. By focusing on the automotive industry 
and particularly on the tenuous relationship between the rhetoric of au-
tomotive industry advertising and doctrinal corporate law, this Article ex-
amines the ways that social and legal actors understand what it means for 
a corporation or its products to be American. In a global economy, what 
does it mean for a corporation to present the impression of national citi-
zenship? Considering the recent bailout of American automotive corpo-
rations, the automotive industry today becomes a powerful vehicle for 
problematizing the conflicted public/private nature of the corporate 
form and for examining what it means for a corporation to be American. 
By examining the ways in which consumable myths of the American cor-
poration interact with the institutions and legal regimes that govern 
American corporations, this Article argues that the advertised image of 
the national in the global economy serves as a broad corporate veil, ob-
scuring the consumer’s understanding of corporate identity and corpo-
rate accountability. This Article situates the identification of corporate na-
tionality within a broader framework of debates on corporate social 
responsibility and interrogates long-held cultural conceptions of the 
American corporation and corporate decision making. 
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Introduction 
[Corporations] cannot commit treason, nor be . . . outlawed, nor excommuni-
cate[d], for they have no souls.1 
Americanism is to the American not a tradition or a territory, not what 
France is to a Frenchman or England to an Englishman, but a doc-
trine . . . .2 
Americanism can appear like a form of make-up, a superficial foreign fash-
ion.3 
 
 It is 1988 and a non-descript, middle-aged, neatly dressed, white 
man stands on a well-lit soundstage. In a smarmy, nasal voice, he ex-
plains that he will describe the difference between the Isuzu Trooper, a 
sport-utility vehicle, and a “Cherokee.”4 Behind him, instead of the 
popular Jeep Cherokee 4x4, a dark-skinned man sits on a horse in tra-
ditional, Native American garb.5 During the thirty-second television 
spot, the suit-clad pitch-man plays on the Native American’s outdated 
means of transportation and inability to speak English to sing the prais-
es of the Trooper and mock the competition’s shortcomings.6 For in-
stance, unlike the horse (and presumably the Cherokee 4x4), the ad-
vertised vehicle comes with standard power steering.7 
 Viewed through a contemporary lens, the 1988 truck commercial 
appears highly dated. Overt racism (at least at the expense of Native 
Americans) is generally considered sufficiently tasteless to be unaccept-
able for mainstream television advertising. And the idea of promoting a 
car by showing it immobile on a soundstage has largely been rejected 
by an advertising culture that values frenetic camera work, action-shot 
montages, and vignettes that emphasize the vehicle’s assumed appeal to 
certain demographic or social groups.8 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 Case of Sutton’s Hospital, (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B.) 973. 
2 Leon Samson, Americanism as Surrogate Socialism, in Failure of a Dream? Essays in 
the History of American Socialism 426, 426 ( John H.M. Laslett & Seymour Martin 
Lipset eds., 1974). 
3 Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci 318 (Quintin Hoare 
& Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. & trans., 1971) [hereinafter Gramsci]. 
4 Isuzu, Isuzu Truck Commercial with Cherokee, YouTube ( June 2, 2008), http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=4ynXNzRNZpI&feature=related. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Compare Heon Stevenson, American Automobile Advertising, 1930–1980: An Il-
lustrated History 214–39 (2008) (displaying automobile advertisements from the 1960s 
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 In light of the Trooper commercial’s obvious American cultural 
references (Native Americans and disingenuous car salesmen), what is 
most striking is that the Trooper is not an American car. The adver-
tisement was part of a hugely successful campaign by Japanese manu-
facturer Isuzu Motors Limited to market trucks and sport-utility vehi-
cles to an American market by appealing to the quintessentially 
American automotive culture by creating a stereotypically sleazy Anglo 
car salesman, “Joe Isuzu.” 
 More than twenty years later, Joe Isuzu no longer sells cars to 
American consumers.9 In fact, Isuzu has withdrawn from the American 
passenger car market.10 The Jeep Cherokee is no longer on the market; 
it has been replaced by smaller, more fuel-efficient or larger, more fam-
ily-friendly alternatives.11 Also, Native Americans on horseback are not 
popular with the twenty-first century marketing machine, having been 
replaced by different stereotypes and cultural outsiders. What remains 
the same, however, is the domestic success of non-American automo-
biles and the drive to appeal to American consumers; in fact, with the 
rise of global capital markets and increased trade with other industrial 
and manufacturing hubs in the wake of the Soviet Union’s demise, 
                                                                                                                      
and 1970s demonstrating a focus on the automobile as a stationary, practical collection of 
features geared to consumers interested in the actual technical specifications of vehicles), 
and Tony Swan, Retro Ride: Advertising Art of the American Automobile 156–63 
(2002) (displaying automotive advertisements from the 1960s that generally show cars at 
rest, frequently without drivers or passengers, and often simply set against landscapes or 
colorful backdrops), with MGM, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1291, 
1303–04 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (denying defendant Honda’s motion for summary judgment in 
MGM’s suit alleging that a Honda commercial featuring a spy-movie-styled car chase cap-
tured the essence of James Bond infringed MGM’s copyright in that character), and Liza-
beth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar 
America 301 (2003) (describing the growth of demographic and sociological research in 
marketing automobiles to consumers). 
9 See, e.g., Ken Bensinger, Isuzu Quitting U.S. Car Market, L.A. Times, Jan. 31, 2008, at 
C1. 
Joe Isuzu, meanwhile, made Isuzu a very popular brand. After building pick-
ups for GM in the 1970s, Isuzu began selling its own vehicles in the U.S. in 
1981, with low-cost vehicles such as the Pup pickup and the Trooper. Aside 
from the Jeep Cherokee, the Trooper was the only four-door SUV available 
for years, and it helped build a market for what would become a hugely suc-
cessful category. 
Id. 
10 Id. 
11 See, e.g., David Kiley, Chrysler’s New Owner Has Serious Marketing Work to Do, Bloom-
berg Bus. Wk., May 23, 2007, http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/brandnewday/ 
archives/2007/05/chryslers_new_o.html. 
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there has been an influx of non-American automobiles.12 Where Isuzu 
was fighting an uphill battle against a well-established, firmly en-
sconced, domestic truck market in the eighties, trucks and sport-utility 
vehicles produced and marketed today by Asian corporations have sold 
widely, winning over numerous American consumers.13 One thing has 
remained constant during this period of upheaval in our consumer cul-
ture: the drive to appeal to the American buyer on the buyer’s own 
terms. In other words, it may be that today’s consumers have shown 
themselves willing to buy vehicles made, designed, assembled, or fi-
nanced abroad, but the subscript (or perhaps superscript) of the car as 
the “American” product and the car company as the “American” corpo-
ration has not lost its significance. 
 As one of the central recurring tropes in American automotive 
advertising, “Americanness” —whether in the form of Presidents’ Day 
sales,14 patriotic vehicle names,15 or even nationally directed apologies 
or product recalls16—is a crucial component of our understanding of 
how we, as a society, conceive of the corporation as a cultural and socio-
legal entity. This Article seeks to challenge this corporate-constructed 
image of American business and American industry. By focusing on the 
automotive industry, and particularly on automotive-industry advertis-
ing, the Article examines the ways that we—as social actors, legal actors, 
and (perhaps above all) consumers—understand what it means for a 
corporation or a corporation’s product to be American. In a global 
                                                                                                                      
12 See, e.g., Toyota Announces Best Sales Year in Its 46-Year History, Breaks Sales Record for 
Eighth Year in a Row, Auto Channel (Jan. 5, 2004), http://www.theautochannel.com/news 
/2004/01/05/175869.html. 
13 See, e.g., id.; Toyota Sets Sales Record for Sixth Year in a Row, Auto Channel ( Jan. 3, 
2002), http://www.theautochannel.com/news/2002/01/03/034042.html. 
14 See Peter DeMarco, Behind the Presidents’ Day Car Sales Push, Bos. Globe, Feb. 11, 
2010, http://www.boston.com/cars/newsandreviews/overdrive/2010/02/behind_the_pre 
sidents_day_car_sales_push.html (describing Presidents’ Day as a holiday for the automo-
tive industry, exemplified by “red, white and blue balloons, salesmen dressed in colonial 
garb and whatever other gimmicks dealers use to hype the day”). 
15 Over the past decade, for instance, the Jeep division of Chrysler supplemented its 
already frontier-themed product lineup—the Cherokee, the Grand Cherokee, and the 
Wrangler—with more explicitly “American”-named vehicles—the Patriot and the Liberty. 
See, e.g., James M. Flammang, Time to Say Goodbye in Many Languages, Chi. Trib., Sept. 30, 
2001, § 12, at 23B (discussing the Liberty’s arrival on the market); James R. Healey, 2007 
Patriot No Wimp in the Wild, USA Today, May 25, 2007, at 5B (reviewing the newly released 
Patriot). 
16 See, e.g., “Restore” TV Commercial, Toyota, http://www.toyota.com/recall/videos/ 
restore-commercial.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2012) (showing pictures of early industrial 
America while describing the importance of the corporation’s commitment to consumers 
and consumer safety). 
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economy where labor, profits, and environmental effects reach across 
national borders, what does it mean for a corporation to present the 
impression of national citizenship? When we “buy American,” are we 
acting in hopes of affecting our domestic situational forces, or are we 
simply being manipulated by broader situational forces and allowing 
corporations to profit by refusing to internalize their externalities, both 
in the domestic and the global spheres? 
 Because our legal system ostensibly controls corporate behavior 
that affects non-shareholders, not by means of corporate law but by 
means of other regulatory structures,17 the global nature of many mod-
ern corporations would complicate or perhaps even confound any sort 
of meaningful domestic regulation. In other words, even if we were to 
concede that corporate law’s macro script—the corporation’s sole re-
sponsibility should be to create greater profits for its shareholders—is 
acceptable (because other areas of law protect non-shareholder inter-
ests), how should our understanding of this macro script change in a 
climate in which those other areas of law may cease to have any clout? 
 Certainly, stream of commerce doctrine and other jurisdictional 
rules would allow some suits against corporations that operate in the 
domestic economy or do business with American consumers.18 But 
                                                                                                                      
 
17 See, e.g., Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law 692 (1986) (“These currently 
available controls include market forces, for example, corporate behavior is powerfully 
affected by consumer choices; legal mechanisms, for example, consumers can sue under 
existing tort law and consumer protection laws; and the right to lobby governments to tax 
and regulate corporations in certain ways.”). 
[T]he most efficacious legal mechanisms for protecting the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies—or at least all constituencies other than credi-
tors—lie outside of corporate law. For workers, this includes the law of labor 
contracting, pension law, health and safety law, and antidiscrimination law. 
For consumers, it includes product safety regulation, warranty law, tort law 
governing product liability, antitrust law, and mandatory disclosure of prod-
uct contents and characteristics. For the public at large, it includes environ-
mental law and the law of nuisance and mass torts. 
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 Geo. 
L.J. 439, 442 (2001); see also Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimat-
ing Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 57 (2004) (“Relatedly, 
Allen and Kraakman, in their just-published casebook, note that ‘[t]he laws of taxation, 
education, environmental and labor policy, product safety, and other issues of health, safe-
ty, and welfare’ exist to ‘address the distribution of risks and rewards in society.’” (quoting 
William T. Allen & Reinier Kraakman, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of 
Business Organization 2 (2003))). 
18 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 4; Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 
108–13 (1987); Parry v. Ernst Home Ctr. Corp., 779 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah 1989). Jurisdic-
tional issues arising in suits against global or foreign corporations have been addressed 
under the Alien Tort Statute rubric. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). Recent case law interpreting 
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does the lack of strictly enforced international regulations on labor 
practices or environmental impacts allow for a significant degree of 
immunity for many of these increasingly global corporations? Is the 
concept of the American corporation governed by democratically cre-
ated American law ultimately anything more than an illusion in a global 
economy without shared norms or enforcement mechanisms to regu-
late behavior or practices?19 
                                                                                                                     
 By examining the ways in which consumable myths of the Ameri-
can corporation interact with the institutions and legal regimes that 
govern American corporations, this Article argues that the advertised 
image of the nation-state in the global economy serves as a broad cor-
porate veil. It clouds the consumer’s understanding of corporate iden-
tity and corporate accountability—a legal fiction that obscures respon-
sibility and deflects blame. 
 Although this Article deals primarily with the automotive industry, 
it does not suggest that concepts of Americanness are unique to auto-
mobile advertising or that questions of corporate citizenship or na-
tional identity are exclusive to the automotive industry. The ideal of 
America—whether represented by appeals to increased public en-
gagement in liberal democracy, participation in free markets, or simply 
evocation of national icons and mythos—is prevalent in domestic mass 
culture and modern advertising. This appeal to some collective con-
sciousness that employs specific images, demographic reference points, 
and images that trigger broader cultural or psychological associations 
has been a staple of mainstream corporate advertising since at least the 
end of the Second World War.20 Indeed, this technique has lead to a 
presentation of the corporation and the American way of life as symbi-
otic to the point that the corporate form is viewed as crucial to the 
functioning of the domestic economy and the national way of life.21 
 
 
the Alien Tort Statute, however, suggests that it might be difficult to use traditional tort 
principles to address corporate misfeasance abroad or with foreign consequences. See 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010) (rejecting argu-
ments that corporations could be held liable for tortious acts under the Alien Tort Stat-
ute), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). 
19 Here, and throughout, this Article borrows from Ronald Chen and Jon Hanson the 
concept that corporate regulation is largely illusory, commonly referred to as the “illusion 
of law.” Chen & Hanson, supra note 17, at 3–5. 
20 See Cohen, supra note 8, at 299–300; Stuart Ewen, PR!: A Social History of Spin 
131–45 (1996); Roland Marchand, Creating the Corporate Soul: The Rise of Pub-
lic Relations and Corporate Imagery in American Big Business 88 (1998). 
21 See Marchand, supra note 20, at 88. Michael Denning has provided a broader dis-
cussion of the role of American exceptionalism in the study of mass culture and political 
economy. See Michael Denning, Culture in the Age of Three Worlds 169–92 (2004); 
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 That being said, certain industries in which domestic manufactur-
ers have long enjoyed a particular market share—whether because of 
supply, demand, cost, quality, or some other intangible factor— dem-
onstrate a more marked reliance on the corporate advertiser’s national-
ity in branding and marketing its products. Like the tobacco industry,22 
the automotive industry has generally been dominated by American 
corporations.23 Also, with the rise of suburbia and commuter culture, 
the car, perhaps more than any other modern invention, has become 
synonymous with and essential to the national way of life.24 Addition-
ally, and perhaps more importantly for the sake of understanding the 
effects on consumers and, in turn, the national identity of a corpora-
tion, the automotive industry has a storied and tenuous relationship 
with organized labor, environmental regulation, and products liability 
tort claims.25 Finally, considering the recent bailout of the major 
American automotive corporations, the automotive industry today is a 
powerful vehicle for problematizing the conflicted public/private na-
ture of the corporate form.26 
                                                                                                                      
see also Sacvan Bercovitch, The Rites of Assent: Transformations in the Symbolic 
Construction of America 353–76 (1993) (observing the lack of consensus on what 
“Americanness” stands for in contemporary American society and discussing this issue 
through the lens of American literary criticism). 
22 I refer to the tobacco industry here by way of analogy because it has been a frequent 
target of critics of corporate irresponsibility and has frequently been addressed in terms of 
or in conjunction with the role of consumer advertising in American society. See Jon D. 
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipula-
tion, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1422, 1466–1502 (1999) (addressing the role of advertising in the 
tobacco industry). 
23 See Stephen Cooney & Brent D. Yacobucci, U.S. Automotive Industry: Policy 
Overview and Recent History 1 (2007) (“In the immediate post-World War II era, the 
auto industry was seen as both a pillar and a beneficiary of American growth and eco-
nomic achievement. . . . Among foreign producers, only Volkswagen and a few luxury and 
sports cars had even small niches in the U.S. marketplace.”). 
24 Cf. Robert J. Antonio & Alessandro Bonanno, A New Global Capitalism?: From “Ameri-
canism and Fordism” to “Americanization-Globalization,” 41 Am. Stud., Summer/Fall 2000 at 
33, 36, available at https://journals.ku.edu/index.php/amerstud/issue/view/252 (click 
“pdf” link associated with article title) (“While most major capitalist societies were forced 
to rebuild after the war, U.S. manufacturing firms dominated their huge home market and 
much of the world market in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite major growth of the service 
sector, manufacturing still drove the U.S. postwar expansion. Explosive growth of federally 
subsidized suburbs (single-family homes and highway systems) and of the standard middle-
class consumer package (e.g., autos and home appliances) forged a new mass consumer 
society.”). 
25 Cf. Ralph Nader, Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-In Dangers of the Amer-
ican Automobile 327, 332 (1965). 
26 See David E. Sanger et al., Bush Aids Detroit, But Hard Choices Wait for Obama, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 20, 2008, at A1. 
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 With these overarching issues and questions as a guide, this Article 
employs the language of situationism27 and cultural studies28 to situate 
the identification of corporate nationality within a broader framework 
of debates on corporate social responsibility and interrogates the way 
that we conceive of the American corporation and corporate decision 
making. The Article will proceed in three Parts that are loosely chrono-
logical but will overlap significantly in places. 
 Part I briefly traces the rise of the automotive industry as the quin-
tessential American industry, linking ideas of Fordism and Second 
World War–era, national consumer solidarity with the postwar boom in 
consumerism and public relations.29 
 Part II examines the postwar challenges American automotive cor-
porations faced.30 This Part addresses the attempts to regulate and 
check undesirable elements of the industry—from the rise of the Unit-
ed Auto Workers to the work of Ralph Nader—occurring at the same 
time as the automobile continued to captivate the collective conscious-
ness.31 Using the “illusion-of-law hypothesis”32 and the idea of deep 
capture,33 this Part begins to describe the conflict between the macro 
schema that the American corporation is good for American society 
and the micro schemas that reject the idea of corporate responsibility 
to American societal concerns.34 
 Finally, Part III addresses the rise of the “foreign” automotive 
corporation.35 This Part examines American corporations’ attempts to 
                                                                                                                      
27 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of 
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 630, 747 (1999); Hanson & Kysar, supra note 22, at 
1571–72; Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Char-
acter, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 129, 136–37 
(2003). 
28 See Denning, supra note 21, at 148–51; Frederic Jameson, The Cultural Turn: 
Selected Writings on the Postmodern 1983–1998, at 17–20 (1998); Raymond Wil-
liams, Problems in Materialism and Culture: Selected Essays 177–95 (1980); The 
Cultures of Globalization, at xi–xvii (Frederic Jameson & Masao Miyoshi eds., 1998); 
Richard Maxwell, Why Culture Works, in Culture Works: The Political Economy of 
Culture 1, 1–20 (Richard Maxwell ed., 2001). 
29 See infra notes 39–98 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 99–161 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 99–161 and accompanying text. 
32 See Chen & Hanson, supra note 17, at 3–5. 
33 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 27, at 218–85. Hanson and Yosifon describe “deep 
capture” as “the disproportionate and self-serving influence that the relatively powerful 
tend to exert over all the exterior and interior situational features that materially influence 
the maintenance and extension of that power—including those features that purport to 
be, and that we experience as, independent, volitional, and benign.” Id. at 218. 
34 See infra notes 99–161 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 162–256 and accompanying text. 
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protect their turf by invoking patriotism and nationalist themes as 
well as the efforts of foreign manufacturers to exploit their otherness 
while appealing to popular domestic sentiments.36 It also examines 
the current state of the automotive market and the cultural concep-
tions of nationality, industry, and responsibility that it has shaped.37 By 
describing the illusions of nation, nationality, and national control in 
the regulatory context, Part III argues that we can view the automo-
tive market as a microcosm of broader global markets, where corpo-
rate actors can exploit the façade of the national at the expense of the 
ultimate third-party beneficiary, non-contractual creditor, and non-
share-holding stakeholder: humanity.38 
I. Cruising: The Public/Private Merger and the Heyday of the 
American Automotive Corporation 
A. Fordist Fantasies 
The idea of the “American dream,” as reflected in automobile advertising, is 
an elusive construct. It points to a social disposition, a corpus of ideas and 
aspirations, variously personal and abstracted, that are in a permanent state 
of flux.39 
[I]t was relatively easy to rationalise production and labour by a skillful com-
bination of force (destruction of working-class trade unionism on a territorial 
basis) and persuasion (high wages, various social benefits, extremely subtle 
ideological and political propaganda) and thus succeed in making the whole 
life of the nation revolve around production.40 
For years I thought that what was good for our country was good for General 
Motors, and vice versa.41 
 
 Although the patriotic imagery and American themes that perme-
ate contemporary automotive advertising may have become so en-
trenched that we largely take them for granted as custom or industry 
language, it is important to recognize that these images and concepts— 
                                                                                                                      
36 See infra notes 162–256 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 162–256 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 162–256 and accompanying text. 
39 Stevenson, supra note 8, at 240. 
40 Gramsci, supra note 3, at 285. 
41 Armed Forces: Engine Charlie, Time, Oct. 6, 1961, at 24, 24 (quoting Charlie Wilson, 
Secretary of Defense under President Dwight Eisenhower). 
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Chevrolet as “The Heartbeat of America”42 or Saab as embodying the 
“State of Independence”43—have been carefully crafted and have 
evolved over decades. Therefore, before confronting the current state 
of the American automotive industry and the illusory nature of con-
temporary legal and cultural representations of Americanism, this Part 
examines and attempts to establish the underlying schemas of Ameri-
canism, American regulation, and the closed American economy as 
they relate to the domestic car market.44 This Part suggests that, by 
looking more closely at American car culture and particularly mass cul-
tural and commercial representations, we can better understand the 
situational market forces that have shaped the evolution of the automo-
tive corporation and society’s attempts to regulate it.45 
 From the “birth” of the Ford Motor Company in 1903,46 the auto-
motive industry enjoyed a privileged position in the United States as a 
quintessentially American industry, an industry tied not only to employ-
ing the American worker and to providing consumable goods, but also 
to a democratic empowerment of the individual. It was not sufficient 
for manufacturers to sell a “luxury” item that might enjoy a stable but 
limited market.47 Rather, the automobile was marketed as a component 
of a democratic society—an entitlement for the working class that was 
framed in terms that evoked the Jeffersonian promise of “Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness.”48 As Henry Ford himself stated, “I will 
build a motor car for the great multitude. . . . [I]t will be so low in price 
that no man making a good salary will be unable to own one—and en-
joy with his family the blessing of hours of pleasure in God’s great open 
spaces.”49 Driving was a way for the individual to exercise self-
determination and to control freedom of movement and access to 
                                                                                                                      
42 See Chevrolet, Heartbeat of America (1987), YouTube ( July 8, 2007), http://www.you 
tube.com/watch?v=0Tf4Zz-1jHU&feature=related; Chevrolet, 1989 Chevrolet—HeartBeat 
Commercial [Long Ver], YouTube (May 26, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NsFC_ 
o10N2w&feature=related. 
43 See, e.g., Saab USA “Welcome to the State of Independence” Ad, Saab Hist. ( Jan. 25, 2009), 
http://www.saabhistory.com/2009/01/25/saab-usa-welcome-to-the-state-of-independence-
ad/. 
44 See infra notes 46–98 and accompanying text. 
45 See infra notes 46–98 and accompanying text. 
46 See Henry Ford with Samuel Crowther, My Life and Work 90 (1922). For a dis-
cussion of the concept of the corporation as a person and the idea that a corporation can 
be born and therefore have a nationality or local/regional identity, see infra notes 162–256 
and accompanying text, which address the globalization of the American corporation. 
47 See Ford, supra note 46, at 72. 
48 See The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
49 Ford, supra note 46, at 73. 
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goods, services, and opportunities available across the growing national 
landscape. The automobile, then, in its initial Fordist conception (or at 
least in its initial rhetorical packaging) was to be a commodified form 
of liberty, a man-made vehicle for the American Dream. 
 Given the close rhetorical nexus between car production and sales 
and the well-being of the “common man,” the relationship between the 
automotive corporation and society becomes very important. If the 
corporation, instead of dealing in steel or iron, is dealing in freedom or 
is selling something intrinsically linked to a consumer’s independence 
and identity as an American, then there necessarily must be a close 
nexus between the corporation and the public interest. According to 
such a public welfare-oriented view of the corporate form, “Whether 
the corporate privilege shall be granted or withheld is always a matter 
of state policy.”50 Indeed, as Justice Louis Brandeis expressed in his 
1933 dissent in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, the metric for determining 
whether a company deserved the protection of the corporate form 
would, therefore, be the relationship of the company to “the public 
welfare.”51 
 Such an attempt to conceptualize the corporation as a public en-
tity (with profits derived from and obligations owed to society as a 
whole) had significant historical backing.52 The English corporate form 
had initially been closely tied to an ideal of publicly beneficial business; 
this concept was generally accepted in the Early Republic.53 In the con-
                                                                                                                      
50 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 545 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
51 See id. 
52 See, e.g., Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, (1742) 2 Atk. 400 (Ch.) 406 (describing the 
King’s purpose in granting a particular charter as an attempt “to assist poor persons with 
sums of money by way of loan [and] to prevent their falling unto [sic] the hands of pawn-
brokers”); Douglas Arner, Development of the American Law of Corporations to 1832, 55 SMU L. 
Rev. 23, 26 (2002) (explaining that early mercantilist guilds in England had been required 
to demonstrate the importance of their business to the public in order to enjoy the bene-
fits of something akin to incorporation). Morton Horwitz has provided a more detailed 
evolution of the history of the corporate form in American jurisprudence. See Morton J. 
Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870–1960: The Crisis of Legal 
Orthodoxy 65–107 (1992). 
53 See Arner, supra note 52, at 26. Even in the late nineteenth century, the U.S. Su-
preme Court referred to a general duty of private corporations to act in ways that served 
the public interest. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877). 
When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an 
interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must 
submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of 
the interest he has thus created. 
Id. 
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text of the 1930s, however, when Liggett was decided, this public/private 
debate had a specific political valence. To enact regulatory reforms and 
expand state power in reaction to the Great Depression, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and his supporters needed to legitimize regula-
tory authority and diminish claims that governmental intervention in 
business deprived citizens of their rights.54 Although frequently framed 
in terms of debates about private property55 and freedom of contract,56 
specifically in the realm of employment and workplace regulation,57 
the vernacular of pro–New Deal legal realists and their concern for the 
public effects of private law infiltrated the corporate context.58 There 
was a significant academic and judicial debate between those who be-
lieved that the corporation was strictly a private entity whose exclusive 
responsibility was to make a profit for the benefit of its shareholders59 
and those who believed that the corporation was ultimately a public 
entity that, by its existence, implicated the public interest and had 
broader social responsibilities.60 
                                                                                                                      
 
54 See Horwitz, supra note 52, at 213–47; Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 
Cornell L.Q. 8, 13 (1927) (challenging the view that private property did not have a pub-
lic effect in structuring personal and political power relations); Robert L. Hale, Coercion 
and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470, 474–75 (1923) (ob-
jecting to the idea that markets are free and non-coercive and that, as a result, private 
transactions do not have broader public consequences). 
55 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 54, at 13; Hale, supra note 54, at 474–75. 
56 Compare Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 554–62 (1923) (striking a state 
minimum wage law as interfering with freedom of contract as protected by the Fifth 
Amendment), with W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397–400 (1937) (overturn-
ing Adkins and upholding a Washington statute providing minimum wage protections for 
women). 
57 Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64–65 (1905) (holding that a New York 
law that imposed restrictions on bakers’ work hours was unconstitutional and that the 
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed a substantive due process right to freedom of con-
tract), with W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 397–400 (denying that the Constitution guaranteed 
freedom of contract). 
58 Cf. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. 
Rev. 809, 809–12 (1935) (critiquing the reasoning in Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 
N.E. 915, 918 (N.Y. 1917) and Bank of America v. Whitney Central National Bank, 261 U.S. 
171, 173 (1923) as demonstrating a methodological preoccupation with “transcendental 
nonsense” at the expense of logic or actual analysis of the facts—the concrete effects of the 
law). 
59 See, e.g., Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property 293 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932). See generally A.A. Berle, Jr., 
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1931) (emphasizing the corpora-
tion’s obligations to shareholders); A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: 
A Note, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365 (1932) (responding to critics of the shareholder-primacy 
conception of corporate responsibility). 
60 See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1145 (1932) (arguing that corporations owed a duty to shareholders as well as to 
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 An alternative view of the role of the corporation in society—often 
referred to as Fordism—relied on an understanding of the domestic 
economy as a closed system.61 In other words, Ford’s ideal that “no man 
making a good salary [would] be unable to own” a car can be seen as a 
response to concerns that the automotive industry would be inherently 
limited like other markets for luxury goods;62 unless there were con-
sumers, there could be no profits. The corporation’s existence and 
profitability would, therefore, be reliant not only on the state as a vehi-
cle of legitimation,63 but also on the existence of a consumer class that 
would provide a steady source of demand. Thus, the corporation was 
vital to the American public because it provided goods and jobs. But at 
the same time, the public was vital to the corporation because it pro-
vided the actual revenue stream that drove profits. Whether we view the 
corporation positively as an outgrowth of society or negatively as an un-
contestable sovereign (epitomized by the specter of the “company 
store” or the forceful exercise of managerial hegemony)64, the public 
conception meshes well with an understanding that “what was good for 
our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa.”65 
                                                                                                                      
stakeholders generally, often including the public); cf. Cohen, supra note 54, at 13 (argu-
ing that property rights transcend a public/private distinction because they implicate fun-
damental issues of public social ordering and existence). Other scholars have discussed 
this debate over the scope of corporate responsibility in greater detail. See Lawrence E. 
Mitchell, Corporate Irresponsibility: America’s Newest Export 186 (2001); Chen 
& Hanson, supra note 17, at 33–37; C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Respon-
sibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 77, 82–99 
(2002). 
At least one other group, oddly enough, also agreed that corporations wield-
ed great power across broad swathes [sic] of American life: corporate leaders. 
As in the 1920s, so in the postwar era, renewed corporate success led many 
business executives back to the ideal of business statesmanship. At least in 
public pronouncements, few corporate leaders failed to make a nod to their 
firms’ “social responsibilities.” 
Chen & Hanson, supra note 17, at 36 (quoting Wells, supra, at 100). 
61 Cf. Gramsci, supra note 3, at 285. 
62 See Ford, supra note 46, at 72–74 (discussing Ford’s ideal of the automotive corpora-
tion in contrast to fears about the limited market and limited potential for profitability). 
63 See, e.g., Liggett, 288 U.S. at 545 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 
U.S. 1, 18–23 (1948) (holding that the state’s enforcement of an otherwise private restric-
tive covenant was public and satisfied the state action doctrine once a homeowner sought 
legal recognition of the private agreement); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 Yale L.J. 710, 747–50 (1917) (distinguishing 
between a right and a privilege in the sense of property ownership based on an owner’s 
ability to call on the state to intercede). 
64 Cf. Gramsci, supra note 3, at 285–86. 
65 See Armed Forces: Engine Charlie, supra note 41. 
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 Indeed, throughout the 1930s, this narrative of corporate-
individual symbiosis was reflected in media ranging from General Mo-
tors (GM) sponsored magazines66 to National Association of Manufac-
turers propaganda films.67 In an era when appeals to labor and populist 
pro-worker sentiment reached a peak of cultural acceptability and res-
onance,68 GM’s public relations gurus became “‘more and more ob-
sessed with the idea that there is a vast neglected area for effective 
propaganda [o]n behalf of the capitalistic system—along the lines of 
something low-brow instead of high-brow.’”69 This ideological shift to-
ward appeals to the common man can be seen most strikingly in GM’s 
decision to advertise in the official journal of the American Federation 
of Labor.70 “What happens to General Motors happens to me!,” pro-
claimed one of the advertisements, before describing the importance 
of the corporation in situationist terms: 
What happens to General Motors happens to more people 
than you can call to mind. For General Motors is a symbol of 
America at work, and of the American system whereby the co-
operation of all promotes the welfare and prosperity of the 
whole nation. Think of General Motors—and you must think 
in terms of many hundreds of thousands of Americans who 
find occupation in supplying raw materials, building General 
Motors products, and servicing those products after sale.71 
                                                                                                                      
 
66 See Marchand, supra note 20, at 240–41. The magazine GM Folks mimicked the 
format of Life Magazine, but focused exclusively on GM employees. Id. As one commenta-
tor observes, “The role of each of the close-ups of individual employees was to contribute 
to one, central conclusion—that, ‘all told,’ the company was made up of ordinary Ameri-
can folks.” Id. at 241. 
67 The film Your Town, which the National Association of Manufacturers produced in 
1939, for instance, reminded workers and consumers that “every man, woman, and child 
had a stake in the success of [the] factory.” Ewen, supra note 20, at 319–20. 
68 See Michael Denning, The Cultural Front: The Laboring of American Cul-
ture in the Twentieth Century, at xvi–xx (1998). In his discussion of mass culture in 
Depression-era America, Michael Denning describes the cultural trends and transforma-
tions that accompanied the social and political workers’ movements of the 1930s as a “la-
boring” of culture. See id. As Denning explains, this usage “refers to the pervasive use of 
‘labor’ and its synonyms in the rhetoric of the period,” as well as to “the increased influ-
ence on and participation of working-class Americans in the world of culture and the arts.” 
Id. at xvi–xvii; see also Benjamin Levin, Blue-Collar Crime: Conspiracy, Organized Labor, and the 
Anti-Union Civil RICO Claim, 75 Alb. L. Rev. 559, 586–604 (2012). 
69 Marchand, supra note 20, at 239 (quoting a GM sales manager). 
70 See id. at 238. 
71 Id. The rest of the advertisement lays out in greater detail the case for corporate 
success as an unmitigated public good. 
2012] Corporate Responsibility and Collective Identity in the American Auto Industry 835 
GM executives might have vehemently opposed the legal implications 
of classifying the corporation as a public entity, but they had no qualms 
about adopting the lexicon of the New Deal and progressive, labor poli-
tics in branding and selling their automobiles and corporate culture. 
 Regardless of whether we choose to read the melding of the cor-
poration and the American psyche in advertising and public relations 
as simply a ploy by a private corporation to exploit consumers or as a 
genuine attempt to create a public (or at least semi-public) commercial 
entity that was symbiotic with society as a whole, the rhetorical associa-
tion of automobile sales and Americanness is undeniable. 
 In the 1920s, before the Second World War honed and reshaped 
the United States into a true consumer culture,72 writer and advertising 
executive Bruce Barton crafted a ubiquitous series of advertisements 
evoking nationalist iconography and symbolism for GM in an effort to 
create a “corporate consciousness” and a perception of a “corporate 
family.”73 For instance, with the headline “Making the nation a neigh-
borhood” and an illustration of George Washington on horseback, a 
two-page GM magazine advertisement from 1923 evokes colonial con-
cerns about “Distance” in explaining the higher calling that Chevrolet 
automobiles serve.74 According to Barton’s logic, the corporation, by 
an odd, indirect analogy, becomes a quasi-governmental entity or at 
least a crucial, unifying social force. That is, the diffuseness of colonial 
society could only be overcome by building roads that, in turn, ulti-
mately required a federal government. Similarly, at least according to 
GM, to take advantage of these roads and “mak[e] the nation a 
neighborhood,” contemporary society required “economical transpor-
tation” that, in turn, the automotive corporation could provide.75 
                                                                                                                      
 Here in Detroit, we who work in the automobile industry see train after 
train of raw materials rolling constantly through the factory gates and think 
of them only as the stuff from which cars are made. 
 They are not only that. They represent the work of hundreds of thousands 
of men and women in all sorts of industry in every state of the union. Farm-
ers, steel puddlers, glass makers, leather-workers, miners, lumbermen—a 
whole cross-section of working America shares in the creation of a General 
Motors car. 
 When business is good for this corporation, business is good for them. 
When cars stream off the assembly lines, orders stream forth for more raw 
materials to keep them busy earning good money. 
Id. 
72 See Cohen, supra note 8, at 112–33. 
73 Marchand, supra note 20, at 130–48. 
74 Id. at 139. 
75 Id. 
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 This parallel to the government of the Early Republic is striking as 
a legitimating schema in part because of an implicit understanding of 
and rebuttal to the potential opposition to the large, powerful, and im-
personal governing form. Like the federal government, the corpora-
tion as a powerful entity clearly made some people uncomfortable and 
could easily be seen as impeding the potential for American society’s 
direct democratic functioning.76 By linking the corporate form to 
Washington, however, GM was able to suggest that its very existence was 
critical to the realization of the American dreams of community, own-
ership, and independence. It might be overstating the point to argue 
that Barton was suggesting that GM and the federal government should 
be viewed as parts of the same extended corporate (or perhaps capital-
ist) family. But, it certainly appears that the gist of the GM campaign 
was that the corporate family was essential to the achievement of the 
State’s fundamental purpose of providing and protecting freedom. 
                                                                                                                      
76 Shareholders might be able to vote on certain decisions made by the corporate 
board, but that universe of shareholders was limited and depended on the wealth and 
savvy necessary to purchase stock. Therefore, while corporate decision making for publicly 
traded corporations—at least in theory—was still subject to a degree of public accountabil-
ity, the right to hold corporate leadership accountable was a much more exclusively held 
right than the general right to vote. On the fear of the corporation’s potential for distort-
ing democracy, see FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 509 (2007) (Souter, J., 
dissenting), which outlines the historical objections to corporate involvement in American 
elections for political office. See also Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 
652, 660 (1990) (discussing “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations 
of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or 
no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas”); Chen & Han-
son, supra note 17, at 135–45 (discussing historical fears about over-broad corporate power 
as deleterious to American society); Timothy K. Kuhner, The Separation of Business and State, 
95 Calif. L. Rev. 2353, 2366–68 (2007) (describing the history of concerns about and 
hostility towards corporate interests in politics); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George 
Logan (Nov. 12, 1816), in 12 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 42, 44 (Paul Leicester 
Ford ed., 1905) (“I hope we shall take warning from the example and crush in its birth the 
aristocracy of our monied [sic] corporations which dare already to challenge our govern-
ment to a trial of strength and bid defiance to the laws of our country.”); Letter from 
Abraham Lincoln to William F. Elkins (Nov. 21, 1864), in 2 Emanuel Hertz, Abraham 
Lincoln: A New Portrait 954, 954–55 (1931) (“[C]orporations have been enthroned 
and an era of corruption in high places will follow, and the money power of the country 
will endeavor to prolong its reign by working upon the prejudices of the people until all 
wealth is aggregated in a few hands, and the Republic is destroyed.”). 
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B. The Best Years of Their Lives 
Americanism is looked upon not patriotically, as a personal attachment, but 
rather as a highly attenuated, conceptualized, platonic, impersonal attraction 
toward a system of ideas, a solemn assent to a handful of final notions—
democracy, liberty, opportunity, to all of which the American adheres rational-
istically . . . because it does him good, because it gives him work, because, so 
he thinks, it guarantees him happiness.77 
To bring this dream into line, for a national emergency, and adapt it to the 
exigencies of federal finance is an American miracle of imposing . . . propor-
tions.78 
 
 The massive industrialization and production boom that defined 
the homefront during the Second World War solidified the rhetorical 
schema of the automobile as central to the American experience and 
the success of the American automotive corporation as essential to 
maintaining the national way of life. The metascript of automotive in-
dustrialization as vital to the national well-being that GM employed be-
gan to seep into the realm of official, government-funded propa-
ganda,79 marking a rhetorical merger of public and private in the 
public understanding of American industry that would become charac-
teristic of this period. As the result of broader social and political 
forces, the formation of legal rules regarding the governance, privi-
leges, and responsibilities of the corporate form should not be ad-
dressed in a vacuum. That is, in order to appreciate the significance 
and evaluate the appropriateness of the decisions corporate lawmakers 
made, it is important to address these legal decisions as “imbricated” in 
a broader cultural and social climate,80 a climate shaped by a set of 
publicly disseminated myths and assumptions about the corporate form 
and its place in the U.S. political economy. 
 Using this understanding of law and culture as mutually constitu-
tive,81 we can gain substantial insight into the shaping of the public un-
                                                                                                                      
 
77 Samson, supra note 2, at 426. 
78 E.B. White, Bond Rally, in 1 Reporting World War II: American Journalism 
1938–1944, at 359, 363 (1995). 
79 See, e.g., Autobiography of a Jeep (United Films 1943), available at http://www.ar 
chive.org/details/autobiography_of_a_jeep. 
80 See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 57, 69–70 (1984). 
81 Many scholars have adopted analogous but varied methodological treatments of law 
and social or cultural forces as mutually constitutive. See, e.g., James B. Atleson, Values 
and Assumptions in American Labor Law 10–11, 65 (1983); Gary Minda, Boycott in 
America: How Imagination and Ideology Shape the Legal Mind 52–54 (1999); Rich-
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derstanding of the American corporation by examining the mass cul-
tural texts that reflected and were reflected in the formal legal treat-
ments of American industry. Indeed, when viewed through the lens of 
post–Cold War, Western economic and political ideologies, much of the 
mass culture of the 1940s homefront is striking in its representations of 
industry and collectivism. With their unabashed celebrations of the col-
lective action of Americans,82 renunciation of class distinctions,83 and 
romanticized scenes of factory life and industrial production,84 many of 
the films of this period evince a sensibility not dissimilar to Soviet-era 
socialist realism.85 The trope of the privately produced automobile as 
part and parcel of the needs and wants of the American people was 
therefore easily integrated into the wartime narratives. 
 Strikingly, in the propaganda film, Autobiography of a Jeep, Barton’s 
mythic revisionism of America as a nation defined by roads (and the 
cars that drove on them), which had been used before the war as a bla-
tantly commercial device, was incorporated into the official govern-
ment narrative of patriotism and civic responsibility.86 “I come from a 
country of roads,” the narrator states over panoramic views of Amer-
ica.87 The narrator further proclaims that “because of the automobile, 
Americans who live a hundred miles from each other are as close 
                                                                                                                      
ard D. Parker, “Here, the People Rule”: A Constitutional Populist Manifesto 53–
115 (1994); E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act 258–69 
(1975); Christopher L. Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American 
Republic, at xii–xiii, 231 (1993); Peter Gabel, The Mass Psychology of the New Federalism: How 
the Burger Court’s Political Imagery Legitimizes the Privatization of Everyday Life, 52 Geo. Wash. 
L. Rev. 263, 268–70 (1984); Levin, supra note 68, at 568–72. 
82 See, e.g., It’s a Wonderful Life (Liberty Films 1946) [hereinafter Wonderful Life] 
(focusing on the importance of friendship and community to the American way of life); 
Lifeboat (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 1944) (telling the story of a group of 
shipwrecked Americans of assorted classes and backgrounds who unite to survive and kill 
an enemy soldier). 
83 See, e.g., The Best Years of Our Lives (Samuel Goldwyn Company 1946) [herein-
after Best Years] (following the lives of three soldiers from vastly different social back-
grounds who bond over their shared service); Saboteur (Universal Pictures 1942) (featur-
ing a fascist-sympathizer villain who framed and murdered working-class Americans, whom 
he refers to as “the great masses, the moron millions,” and who refers to totalitarianism as 
nothing more than a “more profitable type of government”). 
84 See, e.g., Swing Shift Maisie (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1943) (focusing on female 
workers on the homefront); Thirty Seconds over Tokyo (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1944) 
(emphasizing the mechanical prowess of the bomber plane). 
85 The paean to the collective, the worker, and the industrial product was a central 
component of Soviet, socialist realist film-making. See, e.g., Ballad of a Soldier (Mosfilm 
1959); The Battleship Potemkin (Goskino 1925); Earth (VUFKU 1930); The Fall of 
Berlin (Mosfilm 1949); October (Sovkino 1927); Strike (Goskino 1925). 
86 See Autobiography of a Jeep, supra note 79. 
87 Id. 
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neighbors as the man next door.”88 As the film closes with the narrator 
proclaiming over shots of rows of Jeeps transporting soldiers that “the 
Jeep is here to stay,” this merger of the private and public, or at least 
the ambiguity of the distinction, becomes apparent. Are we to think 
that the Jeep—a tool in the war effort—will continue to be manufac-
tured as long as there is a war to fight, or that the Jeep—an exciting 
new automobile model—will be there for consumers when the war fi-
nally ends? 
 During wartime, corporate advertisers eagerly embraced the gov-
ernment narrative of the automobile as central to America’s success 
and identity. In fact, automakers’ wartime advertising heavily empha-
sized the link between buying American and supporting the war ef-
fort.89 In magazine and newspaper spreads that featured a bald eagle 
perched above the words “To serve the vital needs of today’s America!,” 
Oldsmobile advertised its “Hydra-Matic Drive,” a purportedly fuel-
efficient feature, as a way to “Help[] you save America’s gasoline.”90 Just 
like the soldiers overseas, American consumers could fight the good 
fight: “‘Use less gas!’ says Uncle Sam. ‘Drive the Hydra-Matic Way!’ is 
Oldsmobile’s answer.”91 Evoking an interesting blend of dispositionist 
and situationist rhetoric,92 the Oldsmobile campaigns emphasized the 
                                                                                                                      
 
88 Id. 
89 See, e.g., Swan, supra note 8, at 67–70. 
90 Id. at 69. 
91 Id. 
92 See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective 
on the Human Animal, 93 Geo. L.J. 1, 6–34 (2004). See generally Hanson & Yosifon, supra 
note 27 (describing the dichotomy between dispositionism and situationism—two conflict-
ing theories of human decision making). Hanson and Yosifon contend that much of legal 
thought and political discourse has been shaped by a view of the human as a dispositionist 
actor—that is, the belief that individual decision making is based on the individual’s pref-
erences and dispositional characteristics. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra, at 6–34; see also 
Laura R. Bradford, Parody and Perception: Using Cognitive Research to Expand Fair Use in Copy-
right, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 705, 710 (2005) (discussing how cognitive and behavioral research 
has been used successfully in the past to reform contract, tort, and property law). Under 
this theory, for instance, a person who tortures another presumably does so because of 
some aspect of character or set of personal preferences that would lead that person to 
favor torturing over not torturing. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra, at 7–8 (discussing the be-
havioral work of researcher Stanley Milgram). 
Hanson and Yosifon also argue, however, that the dispositionist understanding of hu-
man decision making demonstrates a fundamental attribution error. Hanson & Yosifon, 
supra note 27, at 136–37. They argue that the mind sciences have disproven the disposi-
tionist model and that decision making should be understood as reflecting a situationist 
framework. See id. As opposed to personal preferences, therefore, it is important to focus 
on broader social, economic, cultural, and political factors that make up the situation that 
really drives the decisionmaker. See id. 
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situational constraints of the wartime economy as limits on consumers 
(gas was expensive and needed to be conserved) and also made a pow-
erful dispositionist statement that consumers could fight the war at 
home by exercising their purchasing powers.93 
 Oldsmobile was far from alone in mimicking the language of pub-
lic propaganda for private ends. Mercury advertisements juxtaposed 
bright, red convertibles with American bombers, claiming, “Like Uncle 
Sam’s Newest Planes[,] Mercury Has More Power Per Pound!”94 Chev-
rolet, for its part, boasted of building “[h]undreds of thousands of mili-
tary trucks aiding our fighting men everywhere . . . .”95 And Buick ad-
vertisements from 1941 featured cars against a backdrop of war bond 
slogans,96 creating a strong visual association between buying American 
cars and buying into the American war effort. Supporting the American 
corporation by purchasing an automobile made in Michigan, there-
fore, not only supported the corporate shareholders, managers, or even 
workers; but also, through the lens of these corporate rhetorical sche-
mas, purchasing an American automobile was an act of solidarity with 
the soldiers, the war machine, and ultimately democracy itself. 
 Within this framing of the automotive corporation as inextricably 
tied to the American economy and American democratic culture, the 
next Part traces the challenges to this narrative of corporate/national 
symbiosis posed by the “Big Scare”97 of muckraking, consumer activism, 
                                                                                                                      
 
Such an understanding of the decision-making process—especially when viewed in the 
context of legal or economic decisions (contracting, purchasing, etc.)—flows naturally 
from the New Deal–era realists’ concern with background rules as essential to understand-
ing how legal rules function. See, e.g., supra note 54. This Article, therefore, employs the 
critical realist approach to argue for a broader, situational understanding of how corporate 
national identity is constructed. 
93 See Swan, supra note 8, at 69. Using the situationist framework, we can identify this 
juxtaposition as a powerful profit-making mechanism. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 27, 
at 197–98. By emphasizing the situational constraints on corporate manufacturers (e.g., 
the price of goods must go up because the war causes shortages) and focusing on the dis-
positionist nature of the consumer’s decision making (e.g., you should buy American be-
cause you prefer democracy to totalitarianism), corporate advertisers were able to tap into 
a powerful marketing device. See id. Such a framing shifts the burden for the proper func-
tioning of the economy (and, by extension, of the national economy and the war) from 
those with substantial power to effect change and control prices—major corporations—to 
those who could more easily be made to feel pressure, both financially and personally—
the consumers. See id. 
94 Swan, supra note 8, at 69. 
95 Id. at 70. 
96 Id. at 67. 
97 I am borrowing the term “Big Scare” to refer to an era of challenges to the general 
acceptance of corporate hegemony. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 22, at 1484–85 (refer-
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labor regulation, and other assaults on the ostensibly “free market,” 
shareholder-primacy approach to corporate law.98 It will further exam-
ine the ways in which corporate rejection of public, legal responsibility 
contradicts these corporations’ continued use of commercial narratives 
of patriotism to combat foreign incursion in the domestic market. 
II. “Post War Breakdown”: Challenges to Market Security and 
Market Supremacy 
A. Fork in the Road: Separating Public Costs from Private Benefits 
We view with real concern the warmness with which the Administration has 
embraced the multinational corporations as being “good for America.” These 
international runaway firms, however, don’t have the same sense of warm-
ness for America. Their heart is the profit dollar. These companies insist they 
are not American . . . .99 
 Morality has to do with people. If an action is viewed primarily from the 
perspective of its effect on people, it is put into the moral realm. Business in 
America, however, is impersonal. 
. . . . 
 There wasn’t a man in top GM management who had anything to do 
with the Corvair who would purposely build a car that he knew would hurt 
or kill people. But, as part of a management team pushing for increased sales 
and profits, each gave his approval to decisions which produced the car in the 
face of the serious doubts that were raised about its safety . . . .100 
 
 The reaction of the automobile industry to increasing public con-
cerns about the need for regulation and the legal theories American 
corporations advanced, rejecting the call for public responsibility bla-
tantly cut against the narrative of industry and public as mutually in-
vested and symbiotic entities. Although corporations implicitly ap-
                                                                                                                      
ring to internal corporate memos that term a period of public concerns about cigarette 
advertising and the danger of cigarettes as the “Big Scare”). 
98 See infra notes 99–161 and accompanying text. 
99 AFL-CIO, The AFL-CIO Platform Proposals Presented to the Democratic and 
Republican National Conventions 23 (1972). For the inspiration for the Part heading, 
see Post War Breakout, Woody Guthrie, http://woodyguthrie.org/Lyrics/Postwar_Breakout. 
htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2012) (lyrics). 
100 John Z. De Lorean & J. Patrick Wright, How Moral Men Make Immoral Decisions—A 
Look Inside GM, in The Big Business Reader: Essays on Corporate America 36, 38, 43 
(Mark Green & Robert Massie, Jr. eds., 1980). 
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pealed to a shared set of values through their evocation of Ameri-
canness, in the legal and political arenas, they largely disregarded such 
values in favor of a profit motive that was purely private.101 
 As an instructive example of the tension between the meta script 
of corporate advertising that casts the interests of the corporation as 
the interests of America and the macro script of corporate law that ele-
vates shareholders’ interests above all others, this Part first looks to the 
1919 Michigan Supreme Court case Dodge v. Ford.102 In Dodge, the 
Dodge brothers (Ford’s future competitors) sued the Ford Motor 
Company as aggrieved shareholders, demanding that it declare a divi-
dend payout based on an increase in the corporation’s profits.103 The 
Dodges claimed that Henry Ford, by attempting to drop automobile 
prices and failing to work directly to maximize profits available to 
shareholders, was attempting to run the corporation “as a semi-
eleemosynary institution and not as a business institution.”104 
                                                                                                                      
 
101 There is substantial literature suggesting that a certain amount of corporate car ad-
vertising that began around the time of the Second World War was, in fact, the product of 
a whole new level of engagement with psychological and demographic theories on the 
public relations front. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 8, at 294–98 (discussing the practices of 
planned obsolescence and market fragmentation as enhanced by sociological and eco-
nomic studies), 298–301 (analyzing shifts in marketing strategy as a reflection of trends in 
social scientific study); Marchand, supra note 20, at 229–45 (discussing GM’s attempts to 
appeal to the psyche of the “working man”); The Century of the Self (BBC Four 2002) 
(discussing the contribution of psychological appeals in advertising and marketing to the 
public relations world). 
That the deception of consumers is intentional, however, is not essential to the argu-
ments proffered in this Article. Indeed, as an extension of the deep capture and illusion of 
law hypotheses, this Article is much more concerned with the current state of the law, the 
corporation, and the public’s understanding of how these concepts interact than it is with 
determining or assigning intentionality in the process of shaping these societal and cul-
tural understandings. Thus, the issue in determining how to restructure or reconceptual-
ize corporate law is not which (if any) corporate or commercial entities have acted in bad 
faith or have harmed society by privileging profits over the public interest. Rather, the goal 
of this Article is to argue that, assuming such a broad-reaching illusion of law and regula-
tion does exist, corporate scholars should be willing to pierce this broader veil of corporate 
law and examine the underlying structures that have led to the disconnect between the 
interests that the public believes the law advances and those that the law actually advances. 
102 170 N.W. 668, 685 (Mich. 1919). 
103 See id. at 683. 
104 Id. Interestingly, in the context of Second World War–era mass culture, this distinc-
tion between the corporation as profit driven and the corporation as altruistic was a trope 
that was frequently invoked as a means of distinguishing cultural villains from heroes. See, 
e.g., Best Years, supra note 83 (featuring a conflict between board members of a bank in 
which the protagonist argues for giving a loan to a fellow veteran while other members 
oppose it as a matter of fiscal policy); Wonderful Life, supra note 82 (contrasting George 
Bailey, the director of a savings and loan company who gives high-risk loans and even do-
nates his own money to allow fellow townspeople to afford homes, with Henry F. Potter, 
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 In their complaint, the Dodges explicitly cited the sort of language 
that Ford employed with consumers in presenting his corporation as an 
institution concerned with the well-being of the public, not just the bot-
tom line.105 Rather than being rooted in a legitimate (profit-motivated) 
business judgment, the Dodges argued that Henry Ford’s decision not 
to declare dividends was a direct result of his “‘ambition . . . to employ 
still more men, to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the 
greatest possible number, [and] to help them build up their lives and 
their homes.’”106 In response, Ford argued that “[a]lthough a manufac-
                                                                                                                      
 
the stereotypical soulless businessperson who objects to the way Bailey runs his company, at 
one point asking, “Are you running a business or a charity ward?”). The negative framing of 
the profit motive in popular culture takes on striking significance, however, when we con-
sider that the legal system (purportedly a set of social and economic rules derived from 
the will of the people) has specifically codified the profit motive as business’s only accept-
able purpose. If popular films like The Best Years of Our Lives and It’s a Wonderful Life accu-
rately reflected the public’s understanding of society’s operation, then we can also con-
clude that the structure of corporate law expressly forbade a corporation from behaving as 
the public thought it “should.” This tension between scripts will be discussed further in 
conjunction with the illusion-of-law hypothesis. See infra notes 111–114 and accompanying 
text. 
105 See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 683. 
106 Id. (quoting Henry Ford, President of Ford Motor Company as excerpted in the 
Dodges’ brief). Based on the critique of Fordism as an entrenchment of existing class dis-
tinctions and socioeconomic hierarchies discussed in Section I.A., we could argue (or per-
haps Ford could have argued) that, by reinvesting in the business and spreading the bene-
fits, Ford, in fact, had a profit motive. That is, in order to maintain a capitalist, consumer 
economy, it is necessary to have consumers. Allowing workers to have higher wages or 
shorter work days simply strengthens the markets for luxury goods and helps to expand 
the market for leisure-time activities. Cf. Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Indus-
trial Workers in Chicago, 1919–1939, at 100 (1990) (“The shorter work day and week 
would not only make workmen more content but also give them more time . . . [to] de-
velop new consumer desires. Manufacturing companies in turn would benefit from the 
increased demand for products generated by this mass market.”). 
Far from marking the places outside capital’s empire, culture was itself an 
economic realm, encompassing the mass media, advertising, and the produc-
tion and distribution of knowledge. Moreover, it came to signify not only the 
cultural industries and state cultural apparatuses but the forms of working-
class subsistence and consumption, both the goods and services supplied by 
the welfare state or purchased in the market, and the time of leisure and so-
cial reproduction outside the working day. 
Denning, supra note 21, at 80; id. at 93 (“This accumulated mental labor appears to be the 
property of separate classes, leisured or cultured or intellectual classes, or of a separate 
time . . . hence the centrality of the struggles for the eight-hour day, the weekend, the paid 
vacation, and the rights to adolescent education and adult retirement.”). 
I reference a Gramscian reading of the role of the cultural industry as a supplement to 
the non-leisure labor market not to suggest that Dodge was wrongly decided as a matter of 
shareholder primacy, nor that this sort of complex analysis of the interaction of leisure and 
non-leisure markets provided the real impetus for the board’s decision not to declare a 
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turing corporation cannot engage in humanitarian works as its princi-
pal business, the fact that it is organized for profit does not prevent the 
existence of implied powers to carry on with humanitarian motives 
such charitable works as are incidental to the main business of the cor-
poration.”107 Ultimately, though, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld 
the supremacy of the corporation’s interest in maximizing shareholder 
profits over all other concerns and rejected Ford’s ideal of the corpora-
tion as a beneficent (paternalistic), socio-legal entity.108 
 What is remarkable about the opinion in Dodge, then, when viewed 
through the lens of corporate culture’s advertising schemas discussed 
in the previous Part, is not just that it represents the most direct judicial 
statement of a manager’s duty to maximize shareholder profits.109 Ra-
ther, Dodge serves as a powerful judicial declaration that corporations 
simply could not do exactly what they proudly professed to consumers 
that they were doing. Although a corporation could claim that, by pur-
chasing its products, consumers were buying into their own well-being 
and the well-being of their nation, corporate managers were forbid-
den—under the holding of Dodge—from practicing what they preached 
and elevating broader social concerns above immediate shareholder 
profits.110 
                                                                                                                      
 
dividend. See supra note 3. Rather, I mean to suggest that the view that shareholder primacy 
is essential to the acquisition of profit in a market system disregards the ways in which 
short-term and long-term or direct and indirect gains actually operate in our economy. It is 
completely plausible, for instance, that the use of a Fordist model that sacrifices short-term 
profits (in the form of dividends) for long-term profits in the form of an eventual, thick 
market for luxury automobiles will ultimately produce a more affluent share-holding class 
than will a system that seeks to exploit resources (in this case labor) to achieve the greatest 
immediate capital return. 
107 See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. In contrast, the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated, in 
the 1953 case A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, that ostensibly non-profit-driven mo-
tives can be essential to a corporation’s profitable operation. 98 A.2d 581, 590 (N.J. 1953). 
In holding that a donation to Princeton University was an acceptable use of corporate 
funds, the court stated that “[m]ore and more [corporations] have come to recognize that 
their salvation rests upon sound economic and social environment which in turn rests in 
no insignificant part upon free and vigorous nongovernmental institutions of learning.” 
Id. at 586. 
108 See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 685. 
109 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1615, 1616 (2005); Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 
59 Ala. L. Rev. 1385, 1418 (2008); Mae Kuykendall, No Imagination: The Marginal Role of 
Narrative in Corporate Law, 55 Buff. L. Rev. 537, 571–72 (2007). 
110 This critique of the tension between the legal macro script of profit maximization 
and the cultural meta script of corporate/social interdependence is not intended to sug-
gest that corporate philanthropic activity should be a normative goal of corporate law or 
that incentivizing corporate giving should be the focus of legislative reform efforts. The 
anti-Fordist stance, see supra Section I.A and note 106, provides a compelling case for why, 
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 When read as a counterpoint to the public/private merger in cor-
porate advertising narratives (addressed in Part I), Dodge can be seen as 
a powerful statement of the illusion-of-law hypothesis.111 Essential to 
the hypothesis is the idea of conflicts between schemas (or “incoher-
ence”) as reflecting false expectations of what groups the law will actu-
ally protect.112 On the one hand, we are told that corporations are im-
portant to our nation and our national well-being and that we should 
                                                                                                                      
in fact, it might be harmful for the corporation to be a public entity in this way. From a 
democratic theory or simply a political accountability perspective, it would also be exceed-
ingly problematic to create a society in which individuals were reliant upon unaccountable 
corporate boards for public benefits such as education, child care, or health care. As one 
commentator states in a discussion of corporate philanthropy as potentially detrimental to 
communities, 
 DuPont, therefore, represents the problem of the dominant local firm 
contributor. Its philanthropic monopoly encourages civic dependence and its 
donations can be an unspoken quid pro quo for property tax and other regula-
tory leniency. Thus, a firm can take more out of a community through tax 
underpayment than it returns, although publicity over its generosity con-
vinces communities they are net beneficiaries. 
Mark Green, The Corporation and the Community, in Corporate Power in America 42, 58 
(Ralph Nader & Mark J. Green eds., 1973). In other words, there is no reason to think that 
public-minded corporations would necessarily be wholly altruistic or that expecting corpo-
rations to act altruistically (without actually strictly regulating this “altruism”) would be 
without unintended, negative consequences. 
As a point of comparison, it is useful to look to the debate about the public versus pri-
vate nature of the employment relationship. Since the Progressive Era transition from a 
conception of the employment contract as a private, at-will relationship to a public con-
tract that has an impact on society and can therefore be regulated by the State, there has 
been an ongoing debate about the extent to which the government can intercede in em-
ployment relationships. See supra note 56. In part, perhaps because of a societal resistance 
to expansive, public social welfare policies, legislators have used the employment relation-
ship as a vehicle for installing minor social safety net provisions, ranging from unemploy-
ment insurance to paid family leave. It may be that the treatment of the employment con-
tract as an exceptional contractual relationship is politically necessary—that without this 
elevation of employment, we would have been unable to advance many socially advanta-
geous programs or policies. But by focusing on employment as the vehicle for social 
change, we run a great risk and we ignore many of those most in need of benefits. 
By tying unemployment or child-care benefits to the employment relationship, we fail 
to protect those who are chronically unemployed or underemployed and, by focusing on 
the public conception of employment as a panacea for social ills, we risk increasing the 
enormity of the impact of losing a job. Cf. Barry Bluestone & Bennett Harrison, The 
Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and 
the Dismantling of Basic Industry 61–72 (1982). Like the employment relationship, 
then, the corporate philanthropic model places the burden of providing societal needs on 
private actors and risks under-inclusiveness as well as chronic mismanagement or misallo-
cation of resources. 
111 See Chen & Hanson, supra note 17, at 77–99. 
112 See id. at 77–83. 
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therefore support them and refrain from regulating them. On the 
other hand, we are told by courts and commentators113 that the sole 
purpose of the corporation is to turn a profit and its sole duty is to 
shareholders and not to the nation, society, or some intangible concept 
of democracy.114 In Dodge (and, by extension, in general corporate law 
doctrine purportedly upholding shareholder primacy),115 the idea that 
corporations could operate in the public interest rather than in the in-
terest of private shareholders was roundly rejected.116 Nonetheless, the 
automotive industry’s dominant rhetorical framework of self-portrayal 
in postwar culture remained the image of the corporation invested in 
                                                                                                                     
America. 
 Although Dodge represented a situation in which the court pre-
vented an automotive corporation from acting in accordance with its 
purported public conscience, corporations themselves often fought 
vehemently against the very ideals they peddled to consumers.117 Gen-
erally, in prewar America, labor issues provided the arena in which cor-
 
113 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 440–43 (discussing shareholder pri-
macy as the “standard” model of corporate legal governance); see also Churella v. Pioneer 
State Mut. Ins. Co., 671 N.W.2d 125, 132 (Mich. App. 2003) (“[T]he purpose of a business 
corporation is to provide profit to its shareholders.”); Long v. Norwood Hills Corp., 380 
S.W.2d 451, 476 (Mo. App. 1964) (“Plaintiff cites many authorities to show that the ulti-
mate object of every ordinary trading corporation is the pecuniary gain of its stockholders 
and that it is for this purpose the capital has been advanced. . . . Neither defendant nor 
this court has any quarrel with plaintiff insofar as these authorities and the rules an-
nounced therein are concerned.”); E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Clark, 88 A.2d 436, 
444 (Del. Ch. 1952). 
114 See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, 
N.Y. Times Mag., Sept. 13, 1970, at 122. 
115 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 440–43. 
116 Although it is not explicitly a “corporate law” case and is primarily noteworthy for 
its illuminations on judiciable constitutional limits on the President’s powers, the widely-
cited case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), like Dodge, provides useful 
judicial insight into the public/private distinction in the corporate context. See 343 U.S. 
579, 587–89 (1952); see also Adam J. White, Justice Jackson’s Draft Opinions in The Steel Sei-
zure Cases, 69 Alb. L. Rev. 1107, 1107 (2006). The case limited the right of the President 
to seize private property in times of emergency to serve the public interest. See Steel Seizure, 
343 U.S. at 587–90. Where the realist, pro-regulatory decisions of the New Deal era ex-
panded the idea of public interest in private rights, see supra notes 55–58 and accompany-
ing text, the Steel Seizure case sets a limit on the public interest in private rights. See id. 
117 See, e.g., Fisher v. Ford Motor Co., 224 F.3d 570, 572–73 (6th Cir. 2000) (reproduc-
ing the argument that Ford owed a lesser duty of care to consumers than the plaintiff 
claimed); Mitchell, supra note 60, at 69 (describing GM’s decision not to add inexpen-
sive safety features to the Chevrolet Malibu because of a prioritization of profit over other 
values, such as drivers’ safety); Richard Weingroff, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the 
Federal Role in Highway Safety, U.S. Department of Transp., Fed. Highway Admin., 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/safetyep.cfm (last visited Mar. 17, 2012) (chroni-
cling the legislative battle to pass the Highway Safety Act). 
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porations fought to ward off regulatory intrusions that sought to pro-
tect public interests from private, profit-centric decision making.118 De-
spite the automotive industry’s public statements about its concern for 
the success, happiness, and quality of life of American workers, corpo-
rate employers remained strongly committed to preventing their work-
ers from organizing to demand higher wages or better working condi-
tions.119 In fact, Henry Ford is often quoted as having said that workers 
                                                                                                                     
“would organize Ford over [his] dead body.”120 
 Once again, then, these labor debates reveal the internal inconsis-
tencies between the varied scripts of corporate law. If we were to view 
Ford’s hostility to organized labor in its most positive light, it may be 
that Ford opposed unionization because he believed that the corpora-
tion as a beneficent, paternalist entity would naturally take care of its 
workers.121 But, as discussed with respect to Dodge, corporate law had 
deemed that the corporation owed a duty to its shareholders—not its 
workers.122 In other words, the distinct legal and social spaces in which 
workers’ interests could be protected operated under a different set of 
stated assumptions or ideological convictions. Regardless of how ear-
nest or disingenuous the resulting tension might have been, the real 
 
118 See, e.g., NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905, 908 (6th Cir. 1940) (discussing Ford’s 
alleged anti-union actions); Franklin Folsom, America Before Welfare 301–09 (1991) 
(discussing the Ford Hunger Strike of 1932 that involved unemployed workers taking action 
against Ford Motor Company); Vivian M. Baulch & Patricia Zacharias, The Historic 1936–37 
Flint Auto Plant Strikes, Detroit News, June 23, 1997, http://apps.detnews.com/apps/his 
tory/index.php?id=115; Editorial, “Victory” Redefined, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 12, 
2007, at C12, available at http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2007/10/12/3011447.htm. 
119 See, e.g., Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of 
the New Deal 405 (1958); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the 
Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 266 (1978). 
120 See “Victory” Redefined, supra note 118. 
121 See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text. This view of Ford and of corpora-
tized industrialization as a paternalistic (and indeed patriarchal) public force can also be 
seen in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World. Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (Harper-
Collins 1998) (1932). In Huxley’s dystopic vision of the future, an omnipotent state that is 
ever-concerned with the happiness and well-being of its citizens has also stripped individu-
als of any choice and prescribed their behavior in such a way as to suppress human emo-
tions. Strikingly, the society has abandoned religion and has replaced it with a reverence 
for science and a deification of Henry Ford; all colloquial expressions that traditionally 
feature a reference to “God,” in Huxley’s world refer to “Ford.” See id. at 83, 119, 122. 
122 See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 440–43; Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and 
Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 533, 535 (2006) (“With the 
rise to dominance of the economic analysis of corporate law, a nearly overwhelming cho-
rus of academic voices endorsed ‘shareholder primacy,’ the view that managers’ fiduciary 
duties require them to maximize the shareholders’ wealth and preclude them from giving 
independent consideration to the interests of other constituencies.”); Friedman, supra 
note 114, at 122. 
848 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:821 
world effect of these conflicting regimes was a lack of substantive pro-
tections for American workers and non-shareholding stakeholders 
(e.g., consumers)—an illusion of public protection from private action 
built into the illusions of both the public and private realms. 
B. An Illusion Under Fire? 
based and consistently pursued. It is gaining momentum 
aid Brecht, is the robbing of a bank, compared to the founding of a 
bank?124 
tified the automotive industry 
as a prominent victim of these assaults.127 
                
But what now concerns us is quite new in the history of America. We are not 
dealing with sporadic or isolated attacks from a relatively few extremists or 
even from the minority socialist cadre. Rather, the assault on the enterprise 
system is broadly 
and converts.123 
When indeed we reflect on an organized conspiracy against the public, one 
which reaches into every corner of our daily lives and our political structures 
to exercise a wanton ecocidal and genocidal violence at the behest of distant 
decision-makers and in the name of an abstract conception of profit—surely 
[The Godfather] is not about the Mafia, but rather about American business 
itself that we are thinking, American capitalism in its most systematized and 
computerized, dehumanized, “multinational” and corporate form. What kind 
of crime, s
 
 Following the Second World War, particularly during the social 
upheaval of the 1960s, the macro script suggesting that the corporation 
was a private entity obligated to act exclusively in the interest of its 
shareholders’ profits began to come under fire once again. In a 1971 
memorandum entitled “Attack of American Free Enterprise System” 
and directed to the Chamber of Commerce, Justice Lewis Powell (prior 
to his Supreme Court nomination) warned of a new generation of left-
ists, radicals, and consumer advocates who were waging a war on Amer-
ican corporations’ profit-centric philosophy.125 Justice Powell described 
the work of Ralph Nader as an egregious assault on the “American” 
economic model126 and, in so doing, iden
                                                                                                      
mber of Commerce 1 (Aug. 23, 1971) (on file with author). 
t, Winter 1979, at 
130
 
123 Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman, Educ. 
Comm., U.S. Cha
124 Fredric Jameson, Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture, Soc. Tex
, 145 (1979). 
125 See Memorandum from Powell to Sydnor, supra note 123, at 1–2. 
126 See id. Considering this Article’s focus on the intersection of Americanness as the 
central trope in corporate advertising and popular understandings of the legal status and 
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 Indeed, in this moment of potential crisis for corporate America— 
the breakdown in communication between dominant narratives and 
receptive consumers—the automotive industry became a prominent 
target for criticism.128 Just as it had served as a lightning rod for labor 
conflicts, so too it became the public battleground for advances by the 
nascent environmental and products liability movements.129 Although 
any explanation of why the automobile industry became such a fre-
quent target of this new generation of regulatory efforts would require 
substantial speculation, it does not seem far-fetched that this focus 
owed at least a certain amount to the American automotive industry’s 
reliance on tropes of nationalism and patriotism. 
 With a cultural zeitgeist suddenly questioning traditional orderings 
of American society—whether racial, sexual, or political—it seems only 
natural that an industry that had cloaked its behavior in the language 
of patriotic deference to high ideals of freedom and democracy would 
face a certain degree of hostility or, at the very least, heightened skepti-
cism. As the dominant narratives of American culture came under fire 
and as the war in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal undermined faith 
in leadership, cultural tropes of legitimation that once formed the 
groundwork for the advertising schemas of the American automotive 
corporation no longer reigned uncontested. For example, Justice Pow-
                                                                                                                      
regulation of corporations, it is also worth noting that Justice Powell identified the target 
of criticism and assault not as “capitalism” or “the market system” —both descriptively 
accurate statements of an economic model that focuses on profits derived from bargaining 
parties setting prices efficiently—but rather as the “American” system. Id. By particulariz-
ing this description of the threat, Justice Powell tapped into narratives of patriotism and 
nationalism as well as latent (and often not so latent) fears of Cold War America. If the 
memorandum were simply describing threats to capitalism—an economic theory—the 
threats might not have appeared so vital and so immediate. But as threats to something 
“American,” they became threats to the everyday people whose indoctrination the memo-
randum also discusses. It may have been that the average workers—the “GM Folks” —had 
no particularly detailed understanding of Adam Smith’s or David Ricardo’s theories, but 
they certainly could relate to a threat to the American, the quotidian, and the intrinsically 
theirs. Although the memorandum is labeled “confidential,” the use of this rhetorical 
framework demonstrated the same sort of system-legitimating rhetoric that corporate ad-
vertisers had employed for decades and would employ for decades more. See id. 
127 See id. 
128 See, e.g., Irving S. Bengelsdorf, A Potential Danger on Man’s Horizon, L.A. Times, Sept. 
25, 1962, at A5 (discussing both the car and the use of pesticides as issues that raised grave 
concerns for humanity’s future); Drew Pearson & Jack Anderson, Big Industry Stifles Air 
Pollution Fight, Wash. Post, Nov. 16, 1966, at D19 (“It looks as if cleaning up the air we 
breathe has developed into the same hassle between industry and the public as cleaning 
up auto safety.”). 
129 See Nader, supra note 25, at 147–69; “Tame Auto,” Warns Head of Architects, Wash. 
Post, Dec. 11, 1965, at E13; Weingroff, supra note 117. 
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ell melodramatically warned that “[i]t is still Marxist doctrine that the 
‘capitalist’ countries are controlled by big business. This doctrine, con-
ste
nd happiness through the dispositionist 
to
                                                                                                                     
si ntly a part of leftist propaganda all over the world, has a wide pub-
lic following among Americans.”130 
 Justice Powell’s outcry against “Marxist doctrine” identifying cor-
porations as controlling societal interests seems not only sensational, 
but also hypocritical considering its delivery in a memo explaining how 
corporations can surreptitiously reshape and manipulate public opin-
ion. Yet, it is true that this historical moment demonstrated a public re-
imagination of the corporate form as fertile ground for corruption and 
injustice. Mass culture evinced this trend with the rise of the wide-
spread, genre-subverting revisionism that defined the film-making of 
New Hollywood cinema.131 Easy Rider—one of the key films demonstrat-
ing the viability of countercultural cinema and helping to spark a ren-
aissance in American filmmaking—was explicitly marketed to a country 
that had lost its way and its identity.132 A veritable ode to the inability of 
the individual, dispositionist actor (the drug dealer) to succeed when 
confronted with situational forces (e.g., corrupt law enforcement, 
prejudice), the film’s posters stated that “[a] man went looking for 
America. And couldn’t find it anywhere . . . .”133 The schemas of na-
tionhood, national legitimacy, a
ac r’s reliance on the market (albeit an unlawful and informal mar-
ket) were clearly under attack. 
 At the risk of overemphasizing the ways that lack of faith in the 
symbiotic wielders of power—the State and the corporation—had in-
fected the national psyche, it seems worth taking note of the ways that 
the same narratives of betrayal that defined the work of Nader and oth-
er 1960s corporate critics seeped into the popular understanding of 
 
130 Memorandum from Powell to Sydnor, supra note 123, at 6. 
131 See, e.g., 9 David A. Cook, History of the American Cinema, Lost Illusions: 
American Cinema in the Shadow of Watergate and Vietnam, 1970–1979, at 162–72 
(Charles Scribner’s Sons 2000) (1990); The Last Great American Picture Show: New 
Hollywood Cinema in the 1970s, at 347 (Thomas Elsaesser et al. eds., 2004); Bonnie 
and Clyde (Warner Brothers 1967); Buck and the Preacher (Columbia Pictures 1972); 
Hombre (Twentieth Century Fox 1967); Little Big Man (Cinema Center Films 1970); 
The Long Goodbye (United Artists 1973); McCabe and Mrs. Miller (Warner Brothers 
1971); Pat Garrett and Billy the Kid (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1973); Serpico (Para-
mount Pictures 1973); Thieves Like Us (United Artists 1974). 
132 Easy Rider (Columbia Pictures 1969); see also Peter Biskind, Easy Riders, Rag-
ing Bulls: How the Sex-Drugs-and-Rock ’n’ Roll Generation Saved Hollywood 
61–75 (1998). 
133 Posters for Easy Rider, Internet Movie Database, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt 
0064276/posters (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). 
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corporatized, industry power. In public media texts, we can see an in-
version of traditional morality, where dominant social forces (e.g., the 
State, the police, the law) and characters (e.g., the sheriff, the politi-
cian, the cowboy) are recast as villains, while the marginalized charac-
ters (e.g., the Indians, the outlaws) are excused as victims of their situ-
ational forces.134 Even more significant to our understanding of the 
place of the corporation in American society is a subset of films that 
explicitly address some sort of vague, unholy alliance between business 
and injustice, between the corporation and criminality.135 Because the 
historic, advertised image of the American corporation revolved 
around a positive evocation of the “American Dream,” at a time when 
the very notion of the American Dream was under fire, so too were the 
corporate forms that exploited these schemas. This was particularly so 
scripts that continued to dominate corporate law,137 these cultural texts 
     
for the automotive corporations that had wrapped themselves in the 
ostensibly unchallengeable guise of Americanness. 
 In exploring the mass culture of postwar and Vietnam-era Amer-
ica, it is important to consider why these critiques of the American po-
litical economy did not, in fact, lead to greater systemic reform in the 
corporate context. To this end, it is worth noting that most of the films 
and cultural works of this period cited in this Section have widely been 
interpreted as statements on Watergate or the Vietnam War and have, 
in turn, been seen as focused on specific individuals and events.136 In-
stead of giving rise to a systemic reexamination of fundamental back-
ground conditions—the economic situation of corporate social suprem-
acy—the critiques became identifiers of bad actors. Consistent with the 
                                                                                                                 
134 See, e.g., supra note 131; see also Bad Company (Paramount Pictures 1972); Bad-
lands (Warner Brothers 1973); The Wild Bunch (Warner Brothers 1969). 
135 See, e.g., Drehli Robnik, Allegories of Post-Fordism in 1970s New Hollywood: Countercul-
tural Combat Films, Conspiracy Thrillers as Genre Recycling, in The Last Great American Pic-
ture Show, supra note 131, at 333, 347 (suggesting that a certain cycle of Watergate-era 
films “show attempts at investigating the [political and social] order’s hidden inside, em-
pha
oberman, Nashville Contra Jaws: Or 
“Th ” Revisited, in The Last Great American Picture Show, supra 
note
sizing its systemic character, obstinacy and near invisibility”); Chinatown (Paramount 
Pictures 1974); The Conversation (Paramount Pictures 1974); The Parallax View (Par-
amount Pictures 1974). 
136 See, e.g., Dennis P. Altman, The Passing of the Dream, 22 Austl. J. Int’l Aff. 218, 221 
(1968) (discussing American disillusionment during the Vietnam War); Phillip Novak, The 
Chinatown Syndrome, 49 Criticism 255, 255 (2007); J. H
e Imagination of Disaster
 131, at 195, 216–17 (describing the corrupt, profit-driven mayor in Jaws as reminis-
cent of President Nixon during the Watergate scandal). 
137 See supra note 100. 
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can be read simply as societal condemnations of bad apples.138 
Whether that of Presidents Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon, Secre-
tary of Defense Robert MacNamara, or the General Motors executives 
who green-lighted the Corvair,139 the fault being identified was not 
primarily systemic (or situational); instead, it was rooted in the flawed 
har
lems unresolved and the veneer of systemic legitimacy un-
rn
judicial application.144 Just as in the prewar context of Dodge and in 
                                                                                                                     
c acter of the individual. 
 Through a non-systemic reading that encourages the scapegoating 
of individual power players, these crises fall onto the narrative arc that 
most recently focused on the corporate fraud of Enron140 or the public 
outrage at Michael Milken,141 Bernard Madoff,142 and the AIG execu-
tive board.143 The issue with this narrative is not that the actors involved 
are blameless, but rather that such a reading encourages a superficial 
fix (individual punishment), while deflecting broader, systemic reform. 
If, however, we view instances of executive misfeasance as emblematic 
of systemic flaws instead of personal failures, a broader critique of the 
post-Fordist economy emerges and we are left with another illusion-of-
law moment—another point where our schemas conflict, leaving the 
major prob
ta ished. 
 In fact, despite heightened awareness of corporate irresponsibility, 
misfeasance, and insensitivity to the public welfare, there has been little 
reaction in the corporate law context. Nader’s legislative successes, the 
rise of consumer activism among the general public and on Capitol 
Hill, and some expansion of tort liability in certain contexts indicated a 
limited integration of the anti-corporate sentiment; these changes, 
however, did little to reshape corporate law either doctrinally or in its 
 
he Smartest Guys in the Room: The 
Ama
 of hubris and greed and rampant self-delusion; of ambition run 
amo
 couldn’t admit they were wrong.”). 
 
138 Cf. Chen & Hanson, supra note 17, at 79 n.285; Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. 
Jois, Looking Back and Looking Forward: Sarbanes-Oxley and the Future of Corporate Governance 
40 Akron L. Rev. 1, 41 (2007). 
139 See supra note 100. 
140 See Bethany McLean & Peter Elkind, T
zing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron, at xxv (2003) (“The tale of Enron is a 
story of human weakness,
k . . . and of smart people who believed their next gamble would cover their last disas-
ter—and who
141 See United States v. Milken, No. (S) 89Cr.41(KMW), 1990 WL 264699, at *5–7 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1990). 
142 See Robert Frank et al., Madoff Jailed After Admitting Epic Scam, Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 
2009, at A1. 
143 See Juliet Lapidos, Can Paulson Fire Naughty Executives?, Slate (Oct. 8, 2008, 5:14 
PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2201853/. 
144 This Article highlights the distinction between “corporate law” and other legal re-
gimes (e.g., tort law, administrative law, criminal law), not to suggest that the legal system 
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some scholars’ writings,145 the legal community remained largely un-
willing to reconceptualize corporate law as a space where pubic con-
cerns about business organizations could be expressed.146 
 In 1971, for instance, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held, in 
State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., that a shareholder’s political (and 
perhaps moral) objections to a corporation’s manufacture of fragmen-
tation bombs for use in the Vietnam War was not a “proper purpose” 
sufficient to allow access to corporate records.147 Although lacking the 
specific automotive tie of Dodge, Pillsbury is instructive for understand-
ing the disjuncture between what many thought individuals should be 
allowed to do to check corporate power and what courts concluded 
individuals had the right to do. That is, the Pillsbury court went beyond 
the Dodge court. By selecting a very specific form of shareholder pri-
macy—a protection available only for the shareholder acting explicitly 
in the interests of maximizing profits148—the court in Pillsbury en-
dorsed a specific view of the American corporation. That view was of an 
entity that had a duty to provide wealth to its shareholders but had no 
                                                                                                                      
erates or ought to operate in practice in such a fragmented manner. Rather, I 
mean to suggest that these alternative legal regimes may often be dominated by different 
ideological commitments or may have different guiding principles. By continuing to em-
enjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2685, 
2688
rate Records—Political Motivation 
Not ev. 1002, 1002–03 (1972). 
–13. 
actually op
phasize these distinctions—in the way that the law is taught in classrooms and the way that 
commentators and lawmakers segregate legal treatments of the corporate form—we fall 
victim to internal tensions in the law. These tensions exacerbate the issues raised by the 
illusion-of-law hypothesis. That is, by treating some issues as the province of corporate law 
and others as the province of other areas of the law, lawmakers and corporate law scholars 
may perpetuate a system rooted in deflecting responsibility that is fiercely resistant to re-
form efforts. This insight into the fragmentation of legal regimes and its costs owes sub-
stantially to the work of scholars in other legal areas—particularly labor law and family 
law—who have pushed back against the tendency to quarter specific regimes closely and 
discount the need for and reality of different areas’ interdependence. See, e.g., Richard 
Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28 Berkeley J. Emp. 
& Lab. L. 163, 166–69 (2007); Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy, Part I, 23 Yale 
J.L. & Human. 1, 5 (2011); Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative 
Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 Am. J. Comp. 
L. 753, 756–57 (2010); Fernanda G. Nicola, Family Law Exceptionalism in Comparative Law, 
58 Am. J. Comp. L. 777, 792–98 (2010) (describing two conflicting approaches to compara-
tive family law); B
–89 (2008). 
145 See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
146 See, e.g., State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 406, 411–13 (Minn. 
1971) (holding that political or moral objections to corporate activities are not proper 
purposes for a shareholder to access information about other shareholders); Walter B. 
Stuart IV, Note, Corporations—Shareholder Inspection of Corpo
“Proper Purpose,” 46 Tul. L. R
147 191 N.W.2d at 411
148 See id. at 411–12. 
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d  to advance the values, ideals, or policies that its shareholders ad-
vocated.
uty
te
                                                                                                                     
149 
 The decision in Pillsbury is particularly striking when considered in 
light of the contemporary public relations campaigns of American au-
tomotive corporations. Through its advertising rhetoric, the automo-
bile industry emphasized its importance to the American way of life.150 
And, by insinuating into the collective consciousness a view of the au-
tomobile as both a consumer good and a social necessity,151 the Ameri-
can automotive corporations assumed a greater responsibility (at least 
in the eyes of consumers, if not in the eyes of the law) beyond turning a 
profit. Using a traditional, dispositionist framework for analyzing cor-
porate liability and consumer protection issues, we would presumably 
conclude that a consumer who purchased a Corvair152 or a Pinto153 had 
assumed the risks associated with owning and using an inferior prod-
uct. According to this line of reasoning, by paying a comparatively small 
amount for a car, a consumer must have concluded that avoiding the 
potential for malfunction was not worth the additional cost required to 
purchase a safer vehicle. The dispositionist approach—viewed as an 
ex nsion of the will theory of contracts—would not identify anything 
disturbing about two rational actors entering into such a sales contract. 
 
149 See id. at 411–13. 
150 See supra notes 39–98 and accompanying text. It is also worth noting that, in the in-
creasingly suburbanized landscape of postwar America, the automobile became not only a 
symbol of freedom but also a practical necessity. With public transportation failing to link 
suburban home-dwellers to urban labor and commercial centers, individual and family car 
ownership became a vital means of maintaining communities and livelihoods. See Cohen, 
supra note 8, at 199. In other words, one might argue that, rather than making the nation 
a neighborhood (as GM promised), the rise of the highway, the suburb, and the personal 
automobile in fact dispersed neighborhoods into car-dependent sprawl. See supra notes 74–
75. As a result, instead of liberating Americans, the automotive culture simply bound 
American consumers more inextricably to their cars and to their consumerism. 
151 The availability of automobiles in the prewar years had indeed been presented as a 
sign of freedom, a linkage of consumer choice to democratic values. See Marchand, supra 
note 20, at 233. In a 1930s public relations campaign, National Association of Manufactur-
ers published a Pocketbook of Knowledge, featuring newspaper cartoons that promoted cor-
porate interests and boasted that “[i]n the United States there is one automobile for every 
5 people . . . France has one for every 22; England, one for every 23, Italy, one for every 
109 . . . Poland can boast but one car for every 1,284 of its population!” Ewen, supra note 
20, at 313 (alterations in original). 
152 See Nader, supra note 25, at 3–41 (providing more on the Corvair and its well-
documented safety issues); see also Douglas Litowitz, Are Corporations Evil?, 58 U. Miami L. 
Rev. 811, 837 (2004) (“Consider the Corvair, a General Motors car that was produced and 
marketed to the public despite evidence that it was unsafe . . . .”). 
153 See The 50 Worst Cars of All Time: 1971 Ford Pinto, Time, http://www.time.com/ 
time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1658545_1658498_1657866,00.html (last visited Apr. 12, 
2012) (discussing Ford’s famously dysfunctional (and flammable) answer to the Corvair). 
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 But when we examine the background conditions and the situa-
tionist framework to which automotive advertisements speak—with 
their evocation of “higher” considerations such as gender,154 class,155 
community,156 and national economy157—it should become clear that 
the previously “efficient” contract is tainted. If what a consumer is buy-
ing is not simply a desired luxury good or a convenience that will in-
crease the efficiency of transportation, but is instead a direct stake in 
the nation’s economy or the consumer’s own job or social status, then it 
seems highly implausible that the average consumer could possibly 
have factored all the pertinent “situational” concerns into the contract 
price. When viewed in a situational light, these background conditions 
exert a necessarily coercive force on the consumer,158 making a disposi-
tionist analysis inappropriate. In addition, when automotive advertising 
is so emphatic in stressing constraints on income, freedom, or tradi-
tional gender roles (all of which buying an automobile will purportedly 
remedy), why should we suddenly ignore these concerns in determin-
ing what risks a consumer has assumed or what liabilities a corporate 
manufacturer is permitted to contract away?159 If the American auto-
                                                                                                                      
154 See, e.g., Swan, supra note 8, at 89. For example, a 1949 Ford advertisement featured 
a bo
ou don’t have to be a king to drive a 98 Regency. You just 
have ra note 8, at 151 (displaying a 1959 
Dod is the kind that wants more than you 
get 
 
ok with the words “Woman’s Place is in the Home” on the cover, but with “Home” 
crossed off and “FORD!” written in its place. Id. In addition, a 1958 Buick advertisement 
boasted, “We designed this car with mothers in mind . . . .” Id. at 146. 
155 See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 8, at 127. One 1976 Oldsmobile advertisement 
reads in part: “Walt worked hard to get where he is; he thinks he’s entitled to a reward—
even in the car he drives. . . . Y
 to want to feel like one.” Id.; see also Swan, sup
ge advertisement that appeals to a “family [that] 
in the ‘low-priced’ field”). 
156 See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
157 See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text. 
158 See Hale, supra note 54, at 474–75. 
159 Despite these clear challenges to a system that would ignore situational elements 
and treat car buyers as dispositionist actors, it remains difficult to find any sort of legal 
recognition of these background conditions. See supra note 92. As discussed supra in the 
context of Pillsbury and Dodge, the body of corporate law and corporate law scholarship was 
generally inclined to dismiss these situational issues as the province of other actors, other 
institutions, and other legal realms. Cf. supra note 144. But if we look at the products liabil-
ity cases that arose out of Nader’s campaign, there is a similar tendency to emphasize mar-
ket feasibility and the need to prove some greater mens rea in order to hold automobile 
manufacturers liable for injuries resulting from unsafe cars. See, e.g., Dyson v. GM Corp., 
298 F. Supp. 1064, 1073–74 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (denying GM’s motion for judgment on the 
pleadings in an automobile design defect case, but observing that GM was only required to 
design a car that was safer than other comparable cars on the market); Ford Motor Co. v. 
McCamish, 559 S.W.2d 507, 512 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that Ford did not owe a duty 
to provide specific instructions for the installation of wheel cylinder bolts). That is not to 
say that manufacturers were never found liable for design defects. See, e.g., Gardner v. GM 
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motive industry has built an empire based on a public perception that 
it is working in the public interest (as a part of a broader interdepend-
ence between it and consumers), why should we discount these back-
ground conditions160 when it comes to consumers and other stake-
holders, especially when courts have proven willing to recognize these 
situational concerns in extending greater protections to corporate 
managers?161 
                                                                                                                      
Corp., 507 F.2d 525, 529 (10th Cir. 1974) (affirming a lower court’s judgment that a 
pickup truck’s defective design caused its passengers to die from inhaling carbon monox-
ide); Mickle v. Blackmon, 166 S.E.2d 173, 192 (S.C. 1969) (stating, on appeal from a jury 
award against Ford, that even though Ford’s liability was a question for the jury, it should 
be held liable only if the proposed product alterations were “feasible”); Timothy S. Robin-
son, Court Tells GM to Warn of Defects, Wash. Post, June 14, 1974, at A3. These products 
liability cases simply demonstrate that the idea of profitability still influences courts’ deci-
sions and that there continues to be an assumption that some other institution (presuma-
bly private insurance) rather than the corporations themselves should provide relief to 
accident victims. 
In light of the ongoing disconnect between what consumers understand corporate 
regulations to be and what the law actually requires of corporations, these products liabil-
ity cases that evoke something akin to the Learned Hand Test in assigning fault become 
quite interesting. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
The question whether it is appropriate to apply a cost-benefit analysis in tort cases is a vast 
topic and falls outside the scope of this paper. I raise this issue, however, to suggest that a 
corporation invoking business necessity (or simply “profitability”) as a defense to a claim 
that an automobile manufacturer had not built as safe a car as possible might shock con-
sumers. In a post-Corvair (and post-Pinto) world, where numerous publicly funded admin-
istrative agencies are responsible for regulating automobile safety and performance, it 
seems plausible that consumers would expect a vehicle to have been safety tested, not for 
compliance with market concepts of efficiency, but rather for conformance with scientific 
or medical requirements for reducing injury in the case of accident. Cf. Fight Club 
(Twentieth Century Fox 1999). The 1999 film Fight Club features a protagonist who works 
for a “major” automotive corporation and is essentially paid to perform a cost-benefit anal-
ysis akin to the Learned Hand Test. If a product recall would cost more than the average 
settlement times the average number of accidents caused by the given design defect, the 
protagonist instructs his employer not to recall the automobile. In the film, the protago-
nist explains this to an acquaintance who is shocked that this callous calculation is actually 
the basis for corporations’ decision making. See id. 
160 See supra note 92. 
161 See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1386 (Del. 1995); Para-
mount Comm. Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45–46 (Del. 1993); Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958–59 (Del. 1985). 
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III. Patriotism, Pragmatism, or Protectionism: The National 
Myth and the Multinational Corporation 
A. Strangers in Town 
American culture differs from that of Western Europe because it is the com-
mon property of a heterogeneous postimperial society, rather than of a nation 
in the European sense.162 
The American people have a right to know how conglomerate and multina-
tional corporations operate, at home and abroad, in their dealings with inves-
tors, consumers, their workers and governments.163 
 
 As the previous Parts have demonstrated, it has been and contin-
ues to be a major challenge to define the role of corporations in Amer-
ica, both socially and economically. The second half of the twentieth 
century has been marked by an influx of foreign players in the automo-
tive market and the growth of global capitalism as a philosophy of in-
ternational trade, international diplomacy, and perhaps even global 
governance.164 Defining the “American” corporation, therefore, be-
comes even more difficult and fraught with contradictions than it did 
during earlier periods of public/private crisis165 and schematic contra-
dictions.166 
 This Part returns to Joe Isuzu and the corporate move to com-
modify and reify “America” in its marketing and in its public definition. 
The Part also discusses the ways in which automotive corporations have 
relied on the meta script that has equated Americanness with freedom 
in order to stave off international competitors, while taking advantage 
of the comparatively lax regulation in the international market. First, 
this Part addresses the rhetorical structures that domestic and foreign 
corporations employ to evoke the background, situational forces of 
American democracy.167 Then, by looking to the actual laws and institu-
tions that govern corporate behavior in the contemporary, multina-
                                                                                                                      
162 Duncan Kennedy, Sexy Dressing Etc. 11 (1993). 
163 AFL-CIO, The AFL-CIO Platform Proposals Presented to the Democratic 
and Republican National Conventions 13 (1976). 
164 See Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays 85–126 (Ben 
Brewster trans., 2001); David Harvey, Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geogra-
phy 339–44 (2001); see also infra notes 241, 244. 
165 See supra notes 39–98 and accompanying text. 
166 See supra notes 99–161 and accompanying text. 
167 See infra notes 203–224 and accompanying text. 
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tional economy, this Part argues that the nation-state has become an 
illusion in the corporate context. The concept of national identity is 
potent enough to provide a vehicle by which corporations legitimate 
their own actions, while remaining sufficiently permeable to allow cor-
porate actors to shirk social responsibility and any meaningful duties to 
a wide swath of vulnerable interests.168 
 As foreign economies began flourishing after the Second World 
War, foreign automotive corporations saw an opportunity to flex their 
muscles on the international stage and prove that they could compete 
with the dominant producers on the American market.169 Volkswagen’s 
appearance in the United States was an impressive demonstration of 
the Marshall Plan’s early success,170 and it was not long before other 
European171 and Japanese172 manufacturers followed. In keeping with 
the commercial scripts of the U.S. producers that had equated the au-
tomotive industry with the national economy and the national spirit, 
these foreign incursions into the U.S. market were often accompanied 
by nationalistic sentiment.173 As the Nuffield Organization, a British 
manufacturer, boasted, “You might think that a country with 39 million 
cars and a production of 6,680,000 more every year would be able to 
supply all its needs. But the fact remains that since the war Nuffield 
products have become extremely popular in the [United States] 
. . . .”174 The language suggests derision for the American corporation’s 
impotence—its inability to satisfy “the needs” of American consumers. 
Like the patriotic language of war, which tends toward the chauvinist or 
the jingoist to project strength and to intimidate the enemy, the rheto-
ric of the international corporate competitors hinted at a battle for pa-
triarchal control of the global market and a desire to assert interna-
tional dominance in a peacetime space through the violence of market 
supremacy. 
 Unlike Joe Isuzu’s Americanized façade, many of the early adver-
tisements for foreign automobiles directed toward American consum-
                                                                                                                      
168 See infra notes 225–256 and accompanying text. 
169 Cf. Stevenson, supra note 8, at 222–26. 
170 See William Beaver, Volkswagen’s American Assembly Plant: Fahrvergnugen Was Not 
Enough, Bus. Horizons, Nov.–Dec. 1992, at 19, 21–22. Implemented in the wake of the 
Second World War, the Marshall Plan sought to rebuild decimated European nations and 
revitalize and modernize European industry. 
171 See Stevenson, supra note 8, at 222–24. 
172 See id. at 225. 
173 See id. at 223. 
174 Id. 
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ers relied on a celebration of otherness.175 Some corporate advertisers 
identified a unique feature of their country of origin as an essential el-
ement of their products’ appeal. The Pantera L by Ghia, for example, 
although actually a hybrid of an Italian-made body and American-made 
engine, was pictured in advertisements in front of classical architecture 
on Roman streets and above a description of its “aerodynamically styled 
body” as “pure Italian.”176 Similarly, in 1968, Bavarian Motor Works 
(BMW) evoked the image of the German Autobahn and told American 
consumers that “[t]his is the car that in Germany, where high-speed 
driving is a national sport, leads the pack.”177 
 Interestingly, the entry of outside competitors into the domestic 
automotive market coincided with the rise of market segmentation as a 
strategy for advertising and selling consumer goods.178 Central to this 
theory was the idea that, by appealing to classes and distinct societal 
groups, corporations could not only target specific niches but could 
also emphasize the symbolic, constitutive significance of buying a given 
item.179 As one sociologist and proponent of this approach argued, 
based on situational factors, “[w]here [the consumer] buys and what he 
buys will differ not only by economics but in symbolic value.”180 This 
market segmentation approach meshed well with the self-othering un-
dertaken by foreign automotive corporations because the invocation of 
foreignness (particularly Old World or continental foreignness) fre-
quently jibes with an evocation of superiority, aristocracy, or sophistica-
tion.181 In this way, these class-conscious advertisements for high-end 
European cars evoke situational factors (class, wealth, social stand-
                                                                                                                      
175 See, e.g., id. at 227 (displaying a 1963 advertisement for the British-made MG Sports 
Sedan that tells consumers that “[t]his proud, defiant, staunch British grille can be yours 
for only eighteen hundred and ninety eight dollars”), 232 (displaying a 1967 magazine 
advertisement for the French-made Citroën featuring a headline, claiming that “[w]hen 
you’re different, you’d better be special”), 233 (displaying a magazine advertisement for 
the German-made Porsche Gran Turismo that proclaims of Porsche drivers that “[i]t’s 
kind of a club, an in-group of people who think they’re special because they’ve had the 
good taste to buy something special”). 
176 See Vintage Car Ads: DeTomaso Pantera, ProductionCars.com, http://www.prod 
uctioncars.com/vintage-ads.php/DeTomaso/Pantera (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). 
177 Stevenson, supra note 8, at 231. 
178 Cf. Cohen, supra note 8, at 295–96. 
179 See id. at 295. 
180 Pierre Martineau, Social Classes and Spending Behavior, J. Marketing, Oct. 1958, at 
121, 122–23; see also Cohen, supra note 8, at 295. 
181 Cf. Ron Rosenbaum, On the Sophistry of “European Sophistication,” N.Y. Observer 
(Mar. 1, 1998, 12:00 AM), http://www.observer.com/node/40220. 
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ing),182 suggesting that these factors can be achieved by dispositional 
actors making a rational choice (e.g., buying a car possibly out of their 
price range). 
 Despite the interesting tropes in the European luxury car commer-
cials, for the sake of this Article (and an understanding of the illusion-
ary aspects of corporate law), it is probably more instructive to consider 
the rise of Asian automakers and American corporations’ efforts to de-
fend their turf. Indeed, looking back to the Fordist concept of what the 
American car industry might someday become183 and to marketing 
strategies of planned obsolescence,184 it is important to recall that since 
its inception, the American automotive industry had been focused not 
on creating or blanketing a narrow market for luxury goods, but rather 
on creating an expansive market for mass consumption by working-class 
Americans.185 As demonstrated by their conspicuous focus on exclusive 
                                                                                                                      
 
182 In this discussion of the situational factors at play in these commercials, the role of 
gender is also worth noting. Whereas many of the traditional American automotive adver-
tisements focused on women or families, these European advertisements were clearly geared 
towards heterosexual men. Considering that most of the advertisements in this Section were 
published sometime in the late 1960s or early 1970s during the rise of American feminism, it 
is striking that these advertisements, laden with hetero-normative images of attractive women 
posed on or near cars, continued to rely heavily on patriarchal visual clichés. See, e.g., Ste-
venson, supra note 8, at 234 (featuring an Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti 
(MGB) advertisement from 1971 with a slender young woman reclining on the hood of a 
convertible sports car); Austin Healey Sprite Car Advertisements, ProductionCars.com, http:// 
www.productioncars.com/dx5/vintage_car_ads3.php?make2=Austin+Healey&model2= 
Sprite (last visited Apr. 12, 2012) (featuring another slender young woman seated on the 
hood of a convertible sports car). This is especially noteworthy because most earlier, a signifi-
cant number of later, (American) automobile advertisements focused either on female or 
family consumers as opposed to focusing on the automobile as a sexualized product. See, e.g., 
Swan, supra note 8, at 72–73 (displaying Ford advertisements from 1946 that feature families 
or couples enjoying their Fords); Chrysler, 2008 Chrysler Town and Country Commercial, You-
Tube (Dec. 21, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HRGgRORZOhY (featuring a 
mother sending her children to eat at the “kids’ table” in the back of a minivan). Sports cars, 
like those sold by foreign corporations in the 1950s to early 1970s, continue to be marketed 
primarily to male buyers. See, e.g., Ford Motor Corp., Mustang “Dreamer” Commercial, YouTube 
( Jan. 25, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_1Kf3twdtLw (featuring a man dreaming 
of driving a Ford Mustang recklessly and impressing an attractive woman). Nevertheless, it is 
interesting—especially considering the later attempts to define American automotive corpo-
rations using “traditionally American” values—that the early imports can be seen as selling a 
more risqué product. 
183 See supra notes 49 and 106. 
184 See Cohen, supra note 8, at 294 (“‘In 1934 the average car ownership span was 5 
years; now it is 2 years. When it is 1 year, we will have a perfect score.’” (quoting GM’s head 
of styling)). 
185 This is not to suggest that the luxury car was an exclusively foreign concept, or that 
no American corporations had successfully sold cars that were advertised as aristocratic 
items geared to those with surplus spending power. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 8, at 
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markets, however, it is clear that the non-Volkswagen European auto-
makers were not aiming to create or participate in a closed, Fordist sys-
tem. According to a 1958 U.S. News and World Report survey, for example, 
most import buyers lived on the East or West Coasts and were younger, 
wealthier, and better educated than their domestic-buying counter-
parts.186 Therefore, even though they benefited more from the Ameri-
can capitalist system and (by Fordist logic) had a greater incentive to 
support a national economy that was presumably responsible for their 
success, these buyers’ behavior evinced a trend toward the post-Fordist 
specialization of markets and away from potential cultures of solidarity 
that might have existed within the interdependence and commonality 
of a purely domestic economic system. Unlike these European luxury 
car manufacturers, the Japanese automotive corporations that began to 
enter the postwar auto market with relatively inexpensive and unassum-
ing products seemed to be operating more within the traditional 
framework of American, mass-marketed, mass-consumerist culture. 
 Accordingly, instead of speaking the language of luxury, otherness, 
or exceptionalism, advertisers for Japanese automobiles spoke the lan-
guage of the market, emphasizing economy, efficiency, and other traits 
valued by those purchasing vehicles as a necessity or a limited luxury.187 
Like the mass-marketed, American vehicles, the compact, Spartan Jap-
anese automobiles were made for those who needed to drive in subur-
banized, car-dependent, postwar America.188 These consumers needed 
                                                                                                                      
114 (displaying a Cadillac advertisement showing a Cadillac outside of the Waldorf-Astoria 
hotel), C2 (displaying a Pierce Arrow advertisement proclaiming it “America’s Finest Mo-
tor Car for America’s Finest Families”), 154 (displaying a Plymouth advertisement featur-
ing a woman in a fur stole and describing the 1956 Plymouth as a “dream car”), 159 
(Oldsmobile advertisement featuring a woman in a fur coat and the tagline, “Next to the 
mink, Tornado is the most exciting animal around”). Rather, this was neither a major 
swath of the corporate automotive culture, nor was it an area where consumers were as 
likely to buy with an expectation that their purchase would benefit an economy on which 
they were reliant. It was certainly a market that focused on the dispositional power to over-
come situational hurdles (i.e., buying a Cadillac would make one appear upper class), but 
it was significantly less evocative, of the public conception of the corporation that this Arti-
cle explores than other mainstream automobile models and advertisements. 
186 Id. at 227. 
187 See id. at 236. One Toyota Celica advertisement included the tagline, “You can get one 
for the price of a Toyota.” See id.; see also id. at 237 (displaying a Honda Civic advertisement 
boasting the “[h]ighest [gas] mileage” and “lowest price”); Toyota General Car Advertisements: 
1972 Toyota General, ProductionCars.com, http://www.productioncars.com/dx5/vintage_ 
car_ads3.php?make2=Toyota&model2=General (click “1972 Toyota General” advertisement) 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2012) (“If you’re looking for an economy car that doesn’t have economy 
written all over it, see your nearby Toyota dealer.”). 
188 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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the means to take advantage of America’s promise of employment, ed-
ucation, and freedom,189 but their socioeconomic situation prevented 
them from being particularly selective about what they purchased and 
drove. The advertising campaigns, therefore, emphasized the features 
that automobiles provided in conjunction with their relatively low pric-
es. The Toyota Corolla, for instance, was “loaded with reasons why it 
shouldn’t be under $1800,”190 and “one of the nicest things about [the] 
Honda [Civic] is the kind of features you wouldn’t expect from a car in 
its price range.”191 
 The adoption of this sort of rhetoric (though clearly not unique to 
foreign corporations)192 becomes troubling when one considers the 
actual quality of the purchased products. These economy Japanese au-
tomobiles—like low-end American automobiles—were also more fre-
quently the source of products liability complaints than were their Eu-
ropean luxury counterparts.193 In other words, although the more 
functional, specification-focused advertising approach was a hallmark 
of Japanese imports and lower-end American models, this elevation of 
technical prowess and efficiency was largely illusory. Differences in fuel 
economy or engine configuration might have been (and still are) con-
cerns for many consumers, but, through market segmentation and class 
stratification, these choices may often be illusory or, at the very least, 
may exist in very thin markets. Those deciding whether to purchase an 
entry level Datsun (later Nissan) probably had only a few cars to choose 
from that would fit within their budget. This meant that these consum-
                                                                                                                      
189 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
190 Stevenson, supra note 8, at 236. 
191 Honda Advertisements 1982 Honda Civic, ProductionCars.com, http://www.produc 
tioncars.com/dx5/vintage_car_ads3.php?make2=Honda&model2=Civic (click “1982 Honda 
Civic” advertisement) (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). 
192 See supra notes 150–161 and accompanying text. 
193 As a somewhat cursory and imperfect way of testing this proposition, I searched on 
LexisNexis using Toyota as the example for Japanese automobiles and Mercedes-Benz as 
the example for European luxury cars. I searched for cases that referred to either of these 
two automobile manufacturers at least five times and also used the word “design” as a 
means of identifying design defect products liability suits. Although this approach is cer-
tainly not exhaustive and surely some cases settled out of court, this search returned eight-
een published products liability suits against Toyota that at least went through some pre-
trial stage and only one such suit against Mercedes-Benz. It also is worth noting that the 
claims against Mercedes-Benz were dismissed, see Quirk v. Ross, 476 P.2d 559, 562–63 (Or. 
1970), yet multiple claims against Toyota were either successful or at least survived sum-
mary judgment motions. See, e.g., Thornton v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 397 F. Supp. 476, 
482–83 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Oltz v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 531 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Mont. 
1975). 
2012] Corporate Responsibility and Collective Identity in the American Auto Industry 863 
ers could neither fully assess the automobile market nor make a mean-
ingfully informed decision. 
 In the legal context, however, the dispositionist framework that 
stressed the importance of allowing consumers to choose among vehi-
cle options became a recurring theme in the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) drafting of safety regulations.194 We 
could argue, as some scholars have,195 that NHTSA decisions allowing 
greater corporate discretion in the implementation of safety standards 
demonstrated agency capture—that agencies designed to protect the 
public interest succumbed to corporate actors and therefore failed to 
satisfy their regulatory duties. Alternatively, it is possible that NHTSA 
decisions—for example, delaying mandatory airbag implementation196 
or not immediately requiring passive restraint systems197—were indica-
tive of the more pernicious, deep capture hypothesis.198 According to 
this view, the very regulatory structure is inherently captured; that is to 
say, agencies are captured without interference by the regulated corpo-
ration. This is because regulators defer to corporations to make optimal 
decisions, while corporations (which are only required to consider 
profit or business necessity in their decision making)199 defer, in turn, 
to the regulators to make decisions about what is in the public interest. 
 Thus, supported by the language of corporate public relations ef-
forts,200 a regulator might assume that corporate executives view public 
safety as a legitimate business purpose. This assumption, however, runs 
counter to the rule from Dodge that (barring some explicit statement to 
the contrary) maximizing profit for shareholders (rather than maxi-
mizing public well-being) is the corporate board’s sole duty. This then 
becomes a situation in which the law that actually governs the corpora-
tion is squarely at odds with the cultural understanding of the corpora-
                                                                                                                      
194 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34–38 
(1983); Weingroff, supra note 117. 
195 See, e.g., Fred R. Harris, The Politics of Corporate Power, in Corporate Power in 
America, supra note 110, at 25, 27–29 (discussing the way the NHTSA and the Department 
of Transportation softened their stances on requiring airbags in cars because of Ford’s 
vociferous objections); Simon Lazarus, Halfway Up from Liberalism: Regulation and Corporate 
Power, in Corporate Power in America, supra note 110, at 215, 233 (discussing the need 
to “check the regulators” in the NHSTA context). 
196 See Harris, supra note 195, at 27–29. 
197 See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 38. 
198 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
199 See Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 685 (Mich. 1919); cf. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 
280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 609 (Del. Ch. 1974); 
Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971). 
200 See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 8, at 198. 
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tion’s methods and objectives. Like the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA)201 (which has lost much of its pro-employee regulatory clout 
through its practical application),202 automotive regulations (which 
were designed with an explicitly progressive purpose) have been effec-
tively de-fanged. The result is a dangerous vacuum where an illusion of 
process and legal regulation legitimizes and legitimates behavior that 
directly conflicts with many consumers’ interests. 
B. Opportunistic Nationalism 
 It is our goal to be in every single country there is, Iron Curtain countries, 
Russia, China. We at Ford Motor Company look at a world map without any 
boundaries. 
 We don’t consider ourselves basically an American company. We are a 
multinational company. And when we approach a government that doesn’t 
like the U.S., we always say, “Who do you like? Britain? Germany? We carry 
a lot of flags. We export from every country.”203 
 
 It is this tension between the meta schema of corporate/societal 
symbiosis and the macro and micro schemas of profit maximization 
that ultimately brings us to the rhetorical use of American mythos by 
Japanese and American carmakers in the later part of the twentieth 
century. With a growing move in domestic economic policy toward de-
regulation, the opening of more international markets, and the Soviet 
Union’s shift toward Perestroika and dissolution, the American auto-
motive corporations were becoming increasingly international.204 By 
the early 1970s, corporate exportation of jobs had become a major 
concern for organized labor.205 By the mid-1980s, “Ford’s foreign op-
erations accounted for 20.9 percent of its profits, and 44.7 percent of its 
assets.”206 Not only were automotive corporation executives and 
spokespeople continuing to insist that corporations were not public 
                                                                                                                      
201 Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–
169 (2006)). 
202 Cf. Klare, supra note 119, at 265--70 (arguing that the NLRA was originally a pro-
gressive, if not radical, piece of legislation that was effectively stripped of its significance by 
its judicial interpretation and application). 
203 AFL-CIO, supra note 99, at 23 (quoting an Executive Vice President of Foreign Op-
erations of Ford Motor Corporation). 
204 See, e.g., John R. Munkirs, Technological Change: Disaggregation and Overseas Production, 
22 J. Econ. Issues 469, 471 (1988). 
205 See AFL-CIO, supra note 99, at 23. 
206 Munkirs, supra note 204, at 471. 
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entities subject to strict government regulation, they were also begin-
ning to shirk social responsibility by arguing that corporations like Ford 
and GM should not be viewed as “American” or as having any special 
obligations to the United States or American communities.207 
 In the 1989 documentary Roger and Me, a GM lobbyist responds to 
a question about the corporation’s responsibility to Flint, Michigan—a 
town that was losing the GM factory that had provided its residents with 
jobs for decades—by stressing the characterization of the corporation 
inherited from Dodge: 
I don’t understand, though, your connection that by saying . . . 
because General Motors was born here, it owes more to this 
community. I don’t agree with that. . . . Because I just don’t 
agree with it. I believe it’s a corporation. It’s in business to 
make a profit. And it does what it has to do to make a profit. 
That’s the nature of corporations or companies. It’s why peo-
ple take their own money and invest . . . it in a business . . . so 
they can make money. It isn’t to honor their hometown.208 
By stressing the shareholders and ignoring other stakeholders, this ex-
planation plays directly into the illusion-of-law hypothesis. By claiming 
to focus on the shareholders, managers are able to retain discretion 
and disregard massive collateral damage to other constituencies.209 
Even more importantly, though, this explanation completely disregards 
a major group of “investors” whose motives in investing are much more 
complex: consumers. In other words, there were certainly Flint resi-
dents who bought GM cars instead of (perhaps less expensive) Toyotas 
because of an underlying belief in the Fordist schema by which they 
were, in fact, buying into their own community and their own futures. 
 What makes this tension between schemas all the more troubling is 
that, fueled by foreign competition and a constant drive to improve 
their market share, these same American corporations that were clos-
ing factories and exporting jobs were simultaneously ratcheting up the 
use of national imagery in advertising. They were emphasizing (explic-
itly or implicitly) the Fordist associations of buying American with sup-
porting the domestic economy and a national way of life.210 In the late 
                                                                                                                      
 
207 See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
208 Roger and Me (Warner Brothers 1989). 
209 See Chen & Hanson, supra note 17, at 77–99. 
210 See, e.g., Chevrolet, Heartbeat of America (1991), YouTube (May 25, 2008), http:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=HYThjgJZFwo (describing American values over a montage of 
quintessentially American images, shots of working-class people, and, of course, Chevro-
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1980s, for instance, Chevrolet ran a series of television advertisements 
centered on a song that featured lyrics about Chevrolet being the 
“Heartbeat of America.”211 One of the most explicitly “American” of 
these commercials featured a narrator talking about “things . . . that we 
have come to know and trust . . . things we know we can depend on” as 
a montage of images of working-class Americans played on screen.212 As 
in the wartime advertisements of the 1940s, the appeal to a shared 
sense of community and a shared set of values was unmistakable. Even 
those advertisements or public relations campaigns that did not directly 
reference the United States are often heavily imbued with American 
imagery.213 When considered alongside the rise of foreign competition 
and during a period of extreme patriotic fervor brought on by the Cold 
War, these advertising tropes emphatically exploit the disconnect be-
tween Fordist rhetoric and post-Fordist (or perhaps simply profit-
subsidizing) legal structures. 
 That foreign automotive corporations employed similar rhetorical 
devices also speaks to both the cultural significance of corporate 
“Americanness” and the ease with which these motifs could be applied. 
Although Joe Isuzu is perhaps the most obvious example of the Ameri-
canization of foreign corporate advertising, we can see the invocation 
of American mythos and the appeal to shared values throughout con-
temporary corporate automotive culture.214 The product recall— espe-
                                                                                                                      
 
lets); Chevrolet Nova Car Advertisements: 1972 Chevrolet Nova Rally, ProductionCars.com, 
http://www.productioncars.com/dx5/vintage_car_ads3.php?make2=Chevrolet&model2= 
Nova (click “1972 Chevrolet Nova Rally” advertisement) (last visited Apr. 12, 2012) (“Chev-
rolet. Building a better way to see the U.S.A.”); Ford Car Advertisements: 1983 Ford Bronco, 
ProductionCars.com, http://www.productioncars.com/dx5/vintage_car_ads2.php?make2 
=Ford (click “1983 Ford Bronco” advertisement) (last visited Apr. 12, 2012) (claiming that 
the Bronco is “America’s Truck” and featuring a red, white, and blue stripe across the 
page); Patriotic Ads Urge Consumers to Buy Cars, Good Morning America (Oct. 17, 2001), 
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=126655&page=1 (describing the rise in patriotic-
themed car commercials after September 11, 2001). 
211 Chevrolet, Heartbeat of America, supra note 210. 
212 Id. 
213 Many advertisements, for instance, are set against quintessentially American fron-
tier backdrops. See, e.g., Ford Motor Corp., 1986 Ford Bronco II Commercial, YouTube ( Jan. 5, 
2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yLt782PxtPA&feature=related; Chevrolet El Camino 
Car Advertisements: 1974 Chevrolet El Camino, ProductionCars.com, http://www.produc 
tioncars.com/dx5/vintage_car_ads3.php?make2=Chevrolet&model2=El+Camino (click “1974 
Chevrolet El Camino” advertisement) (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). A similar theme can be 
seen in the use of patriotic or Western-themed vehicle model names (e.g., Jeep Cherokee, 
Ford Bronco, GMC Silverado). 
214 See, e.g., Honda, Everybody Knows Somebody Who Loves a Honda Commercial, YouTube 
( June 16, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mz4PtO_v9dc. One Honda commer-
cial showed people posing alongside Hondas, included voice-overs of people listing friends 
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cially in Toyota’s recent mass vehicle recalls for faulty brakes215— be-
comes a powerful illustration of the way these evocations of national 
solidarity obscure the actual scripts of corporate law and corporate cul-
ture. In a series of advertisements designed to mollify anxious consum-
ers, assorted Toyota employees express their concern over the wide-
spread mechanical issues, pledge to do better next time, and remind 
viewers of Toyota’s history of reliability.216 The commercials—which 
often show nostalgic images of American landscapes, vintage automo-
biles, and assembly line workers217—stress themes of interdependence 
and reliability. As workers talk about how they drive Toyotas and how 
long they have been a part of the Toyota “family,” it is hard not to be 
reminded of Flint. Toyota’s corporate board, therefore, is not simply 
apologizing to those who depend on their cars. Rather, it appears to be 
reminding viewers that there are other stakeholders involved. The im-
plicit message is that, by refusing to buy more Toyotas, consumers are 
harming the very people (the workers) that corporations were free to 
ignore under Dodge. In other words, from a legal perspective, worker 
layoffs are a collateral and non-judiciable side effect of managerial ex-
ercises of legitimate business judgment. But automotive corporations 
are quick to point precisely to these adverse effects on employees and 
communities as a potential consequence should consumers refuse to 
buy a possibly defective product. 
 By evoking collective values, these commercials also implicitly in-
voke American regulations and the shared background rules of the 
American legal system itself. We are all Americans, the corporate 
spokespeople tell us, so we all have the same interests—safe and afford-
able vehicles.218 This Article argues therefore that, by conjuring up the-
se ideas of shared norms, foreign corporate advertisers are suggesting 
their participation in a shared regulatory framework and are rhetori-
cally embedding foreign corporations not in the largely laissez-faire 
                                                                                                                      
and relatives who own Hondas, and closed with the tagline, “Everybody knows somebody 
who loves a Honda.” Id. 
215 See Ken Bensinger, Another Massive Toyota Recall, L.A. Times, Jan. 22, 2010, at A1; 
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Daily J., Feb. 26, 2010, at 1. 
216 See, e.g., “Commitment” TV Commercial, Toyota, http://www.toyota.com/recall/videos/ 
commitment-commercial.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2012); Ronny—Master Diagnostic Techni-
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217 See, e.g., “Commitment” TV Commercial, supra note 216; “Restore” TV Commercial, supra 
note 16. 
218 See, e.g., Toyota, Toyota Talks to Customers About the Sticking Pedal Issue, YouTube (Feb. 
1, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZCb2dEFBq7I; supra note 217. 
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realm of the global marketplace, but rather in the ostensibly regulated 
and controlled space of the domestic market. This leap—from the im-
age of shared consumer values to entry into a common legal under-
standing—is predicated on the legal order reflecting (at least ostensi-
bly) the will of the people and some set of shared traditions, norms, or 
values.219 This Article argues, however, that, as applied, corporate law 
may not reflect public values. It may instead reflect the renunciation of 
responsibility for non-shareholding stakeholder interests courts and 
corporate law scholars expressed, exacerbated by a sharply accelerating 
race to the bottom both domestically and abroad.220 
 In his discussion of the way in which law attempts to discipline and 
“normalize,” Michel Foucault explains that 
if it is true that the law refers to a norm, and that the role and 
function of the law therefore—the very operation of the law—
is to codify a norm, to carry out a codification in relation to 
the norm, the problem that I am trying to mark out is how 
techniques of normalization develop from and below a system 
of law, in its margins and maybe even against it.221 
By employing the illusion-of-law hypothesis, this Article adopts Fou-
cault’s critical insight to challenge the conclusion that the law does, in 
fact, codify community norms (regardless of whether codifying com-
munity norms is actually normatively desirable). That is, it may be that 
we as a society want multinational corporate actors to have the freedom 
to ignore non-shareholding stakeholders (e.g., workers, the environ-
ment, consumers). But, based on corporate rhetoric, and even the 
rhetoric of Milton Friedman222 and others who oppose regulation or 
corporate social responsibility, this Article argues that society does not 
seem comfortable with these stakeholders being ignored. Further, it 
may be that we believe that this sort of legal action should take place in 
areas other than the corporate law.223 But if that is not the case, then 
what normative goals are actually advanced by corporate law rules that 
allow these concerns to be subordinated to the profit motive? To use 
                                                                                                                      
219 See, e.g., Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms 115–22 (Michael Hartney 
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1979); cf. Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, 
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220 See infra notes 241–244 and accompanying text. 
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Foucault’s language, such an order may be normalizing us to accept the 
profit motive and corporate irresponsibility, but is that actually a codifi-
cation of norms?224 Looking to the rhetoric of Americanness and the 
public corporation, this Article concludes that it most certainly does 
not appear to be. 
C. The Illusion of the Nation as the Illusion of Law 
The nation-state is no longer an adequate or even a very relevant economic 
unit. Conflict will increase between the world corporation, which is a modern 
concept evolved to meet the requirements of the modern age and the nation-
state, which is still rooted in archaic concepts unsympathetic to the needs of 
our complex world.225 
 
 In a sense, the issue that unites the myth of corporations’ “Ameri-
canness” and the illusion of law is the disconnect between general, so-
cietal norms and norms in the corporate context.226 That is, underlying 
both is a disconnect between the background, regulatory structures 
and the policy priorities that consumers, workers, and other stake-
holders mistakenly believe exist and the actual legal/regulatory struc-
tures and policy priorities that govern corporate behavior and decision 
making. This Article argues that the rhetoric of corporate advertising 
campaigns—that stress the automotive corporation as symbiotic with 
both the working class communities and the American economy— 
                                                                                                                      
224 See Foucault, supra note 219, at 56. 
225 AFL-CIO, U.S. Multinationals—The Dimming of America—A Report Pre-
pared for the AFL-CIO Maritime Trades Department Executive Board Meeting, 
reproduced in Multinational Corporations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Trade of the S. 
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havior when it affects the health and well-being of others. Looking at the tensions preva-
lent throughout corporate law, the lack of accountability the law imposes, and the wide-
reaching effects of deep capture, however, it appears that this lesson has not generally 
been internalized in the regulation of corporate behavior. 
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should be seen as reflecting or (at least in part) helping to shape a cul-
tural understanding of the corporation not as Milton Friedman’s227 or 
the Dodge Court’s profit-driven private entity,228 but rather as Justice 
Brandeis’s229 or Ford’s230 legally-created conglomeration of public val-
ues and concerns. That is to say, the American corporation is under-
stood and framed culturally (and perhaps, falsely) as an embodiment of 
American norms and American values—the fundamental unit of the 
modern American economy, controlled by American laws and serving 
American interests. 
 The law tells us that corporations are individuals, that they have 
many of the same rights and burdens of natural persons, and that their 
existence is governed by the same rules, norms, and values that govern 
the lives of other Americans.231 But unlike flesh and blood individuals, 
the major automotive corporations are not really citizens of any one 
nation. When we look at the fine print of any of the “foreign” automo-
tive advertisements,232 we find an address in the United States for the 
“American” incarnation of the corporation. Some of these corporations 
have assembly plants in the United States and use U.S. labor;233 others 
do not.234 A New York Times piece from 2009 that attempts to clarify 
what it actually means to “buy American” in the automobile context 
state
t, domestic is even less clear 
makers with assembly plants in the United States are penal-
                                                                                                                     
s: 
“[D]omestic content” is not domestic at all. For the purposes 
of the window sticker, the government has decided that do-
mestic content will include parts made in Canada. Under the 
North American Free Trade Ac
because it also includes Mexico. 
 Meanwhile, the labor of autoworkers assembling the vehi-
cles is excluded from the calculation. Therefore, foreign car-
 
227 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
228 See supra notes 102–107 and accompanying text. 
229 See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
230 See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text. 
231 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900 (2010). See generally Santa Clara Cnty. 
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
232 See, e.g., supra notes 173–175 and accompanying text. 
233 See Matthew Dolan, To Outfox the Chicken Tax, Ford Strips Its Own Vans, Wall St. J., 
Sept. 22, 2009, at A1. 
234 See Cheryl Jensen, For Baffled Buyers, a Guide to Cars Made in North America, N.Y. 
Times, June 19, 2009, at A1. 
2012] Corporate Responsibility and Collective Identity in the American Auto Industry 871 
ized because they cannot factor in the value of their American 
workers’ labor.235 
In short, if buying American—as presented in corporate rhetoric since 
the dawn of the Ford Motor Corporation—revolved around supporting 
local business, what does it even mean for an automotive corporation 
today to be “American”? Under Chapter 11 of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, member nations may be sued by corporations 
from other member nations if domestic regulations cause injury to 
corporate interests.236 That is, multinational or foreign corporations 
are afforded the same sorts of protections against invasive regulation as 
domestic citizens. Therefore, looking back at Dodge and reexamining 
the state of international legal guidance as embodied by multilateral 
trade organizations,237 it is hard to argue that the law imposes anything 
“stricter than the morals of the market place”238 on corporate actors. 
Because of an acceptance of consumers as dispositionist actors and a 
failure to consider background rules,239 the corporate law as applied 
suggests that, short of fraud or quasi-fraudulent behavior,240 corpora-
tions are generally not held liable for the consequences of their profit-
maximizing behavior. 
 In the automotive context, as in other realms occupied by the 
modern multinational corporation, broader duties extending beyond 
short-term profit-enhancement—to the extent they exist—are largely 
illusory. Over the past few decades, the doctrinal embrace of free 
movement of capital across national borders has generally not been 
accompanied by any similar concern for free movement of labor and 
regulatory controls.241 In the context of these background rules, the 
domestic, corporate law rules underpinning the private, profit-centered 
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conception of the corporation further accentuate the state of corporate 
irresponsibility and the difficulty of instituting meaningful checks on 
corporate power. Decades before the birth of the truly multinational 
corporation, Justice Brandeis expressed concern in Louis K. Liggett Co. 
v. Lee about a “race to the bottom” in which States would compete to 
provide the most business-friendly laws, thereby thwarting other States’ 
ability to regulate corporate behavior.242 Just as Justice Brandeis ex-
pressed concern about a race to the bottom in the domestic sphere,243 
in the international arena, the presence of China and developing coun-
tries that lack labor or environmental protections renders American 
regulatory structures largely superficial.244 
 Where this Article extends the illusion-of-law hypothesis is in sug-
gesting that it is not just the illusion of corporate law and corporate reg-
ulation that allows for mass collateral damage to non-shareholding 
stakeholders. In our contemporary global economy, it is the myth of the 
nation-state, the myth of America itself as a governing and controlling 
legal and economic unit that is the ultimate illusion. Scholars have ar-
gued that this public conception of an idealized Americanism is one of 
the greatest forces hampering more egalitarian or redistributive policies 
and political movements in the United States.245 These critics contend 
that, when political ideologies or policies that challenge the status quo 
have been raised, the specter of America—as metonymic for “democ-
racy, liberty, opportunity” —has prevented those who would benefit 
most from reform or social upheaval from advocating for it.246 In other 
words, when the status quo is framed in terms of a quasi-spiritual ideol-
ogy of freedom, equality, and democracy, most Americans who identify 
with the American ideal become hostile to ideas and policies that would 
destabilize the existing sociopolitical order. The rhetorical narratives of 
Americanism—or, phrased more broadly, identity rooted in the nation-
state—become powerful situational forces,247 means of evoking the 
background rules, values, and traditions of democratic society. 
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 For a century, American automotive corporations have benefited 
from this very conception of “America” as an interdependent set of 
shared cultural and economic values. Facing staggering financial losses 
in 2008, executives from the “Big Three” American automotive manu-
facturers appealed to this broader situational narrative and requested 
federal funding, insisting that their survival was essential to the Ameri-
can automotive industry.248 In time for the 2011 Super Bowl, Chrysler 
unveiled an advertising campaign focusing on Detroit, Michigan and 
the potential for urban renewal through the purchase of American-
made cars.249 The initial advertisement in the “Imported from Detroit” 
campaign featured Michigan-born rapper Eminem and images of the 
city’s history, as a voice over delivers a paean to the depressed, blue col-
lar city: 
It’s the hottest fires that make the hardest steel. Add hard 
work and conviction and the know-how that runs generations 
deep in every last one of us. That’s who we are. That’s our sto-
ry. . . . [W]hen it comes to luxury, it’s as much about where 
it’s from as who it’s for.250 
The message was clear: for working people and communities struggling 
with widespread unemployment, foreclosure, and economic hardship, 
rebirth and renewal could come in the form of a re-invigorated, Ameri-
can automotive industry—an industry for and from American commu-
nities. Chrysler’s message was powerful and compelling, a restatement 
of the importance of corporate drivers of industry to the health of a 
domestic economy. Indeed, in the follow-up commercial aired during 
Halftime of the 2012 Super Bowl, the narrator, actor Clint Eastwood, 
never even mentions Chrysler by name, and the commercial shows 
more cityscapes than cars.251 Referring repeatedly to “Detroit” and 
“America,” places beset by hardship and proud of their “resiliency,” 
Eastwood urges viewers to regroup and show the world how strong “we” 
can be. But, despite its gritty façade and appeal to the real and to 
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community, the advertising campaign is just as much a work of fiction 
as Joe Isuzu. Chrysler’s closed view of the economy has been rejected by 
legislation and treaty.252 Corporations owe no special duty to American 
workers and other U.S. stakeholders, and, through international ma-
neuvering, businesses are often able to circumvent legislative and regu-
latory efforts to shape domestic economic and labor policy.253 The end 
result, then, is that “America” as a metonymic device for a set of shared 
values and laws has become yet another form of corporate veil— le-
gitimating profit-driven behavior and shielding the individuals respon-
sible from being forced to address the collateral damage resulting from 
corporate activity. 
Conclusion 
 By highlighting the tension between the macro scripts of corporate 
law and the meta script of corporate cultural construction, this Article 
argues that legal and regulatory constraints that define the collective 
consciousness of “America” have become largely illusory. Although this 
Article has refrained from making an explicit, normative argument 
about the appropriate socio-legal or political response to its primarily, 
descriptive conclusion, there is an implicit (albeit tacit and insubstan-
tially formulated) policy response lurking between the lines. Because 
the law is the product of judicial and legislative actors who, in turn, are 
meant to represent the collective will and well-being of the American 
people, it seems only logical that Americans should want the law in its 
application to better reflect our collective understanding of shared val-
ues and duties. 
 In closing, however, we can look to the profit-driven factory shut-
down as perhaps the quintessential case of the betrayal of the “Ameri-
can” ideal, of corporate decision making coming home to roost and 
impacting non-shareholding stakeholders. Like the ideal of The Law, 
the operation of a factory becomes an ostensibly immutable back-
ground condition, a situational factor responsible for employment and 
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for lending underlying stability to an entire community’s way of life.254 
Nevertheless, those directly affected by these factory closures rarely 
have any legal recourse,255 any means of gaining restitution for the loss 
of their jobs, livelihoods, and communities. It may be that corporate 
law is not the ideal or appropriate place to address such a problem. It 
may even be that our legal institutions are irreparably subject to deep 
capture and that legal solutions to these problems---capital flight, greed 
trumping humanity, and progress and efficiency being incompatible 
with equality and equity---would inevitably be insufficient or unsatisfac-
tory.256 Yet, in a cultural climate where corporations operate against a 
background of assumptions about America as a shared space of values 
and ideals, it is worth considering whether corporate decisionmakers 
owe some greater duty to neglected stakeholders, the American legal 
system, and the American society that has created and supported them. 
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